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Tax shelter: 'a deal done by very smart people that, 
absent tax considerations, would be very stupid' 
(Michael Graetz)2 
1. introduction 
Spain has recently introduced a new general anti-
avoídance rule3 (GAAR) that presents many simila-
rities with other existing GAARs and anti-avoidance 
judicial doctrines. But these are harsh times for such 
rules. While on the one hand the present context of 
growing globalisation offers an ever greater panoply of 
opportunities for tax planning, on the other, many 
anti-avoidance measures have been the target of certain 
decisions by the ECJ, on the grounds that they put the 
correct functioning of the EC fundamental freedoms in 
jeopardy. It is then pertinent to reflect upon the 
meaning of GAARs, taking into account the European 
context, and especially the ECJ case law on this 
matter, which apart from having a growing incidence 
in the desígn of the taxes in the EU, is increasingly 
penetrating the core of the definition of tax avoidance. 
Implementing any measure that limits the possibi-
lities of tax planning in any way, especially if it is a 
GAAR, is usually welcomed with much discussion. 
Passion is not unknown to the Spanish character, and 
the reform has been received with a mixture of serious 
tax debate and misconceptions about what exactly the 
role of taxes should be. Interestingly, the terms of the 
discussion do not greatly differ from the debate that 
has taken place in other countries.4 This is hardly 
surprising, as there is a high level of coincidence among 
most existing GAARs. As I will later show, the Spanish 
GAAR shares many features with the Germán rule (s. 
42.1 Ahgabenordnung (AO)), but does not greatly 
differ, in its core, from the Australian or the Canadian 
rules, or for that matter, from the main lines of tax 
avoidance case law in the US, Canadá, Australia or the 
UK. 
Technically though, the new Spanish GAAR is 
really not that new. There have been other GAARs in 
the past, since the enaetment of the General Tax Code 
of 1963 {Ley General Tributaria (LGT)). The 'added 
valué' of this new provisión is to try and revitalise its 
use by the tax administration and the courts, by 
defining avoidance in a much clearer manner, thus 
serving as a more reliable guideline for the rechar-
acterization of arrangements that fall within its scope. 
In this article I will first convey the'general aspeets 
of a GAAR and anti-avoidance doctrines, connecting 
their main features with the new Spanish provisión, 
and secondly, T will assess the pertinent ECJ decisions 
and how they may affect its understanding and its use 
in the European context. Finally, I will. pay special 
attention to a recent Opinión of Advócate General Mr. 
Poiares Maduro, that implies a certain change in the 
tradicional ECJ doctrine. 
The author would like to chank Proíessor J  M  Calderón Cañero (Universidad de La Coruña) for his valuable comments on the fírst manuscript, which have 
considerably improved the fina) text  Needlcss to say, the author rcmains accountable for all remaining errors  
As quoted by Tom Hermán, Tax Rcport, Wall Street Journal, 10 February 1999, p  A-l  
Section 15 of the Ley 58/2003, General Tributaria, the General Tax Code that replaces the previous one, containcd in Ley 230/1963, General Tributaria. 
Compare the eritic of Brian Arnold, 'The Canadian Anti-Avoidanee Rule', British Tax Review 1995, no  6, pp  549, 553 and 554 (including footnotes ns  31, 41 and 
46), to Colin Masters, is There a Need for General Anti-Avoidance Legislación in the United Kingdom?', British Tax Review 1994, no  6, who is contrary to the 
introduction of a GAAR, with the critics of Palao, 'Economía y Derecho en la aplicación de las leyes tributarias"  Crónica Tributaria 1995, no  73; 'Existe el fraude a 
la ley tributaria?', Revista Estudios Financieros 1998, no  182; 'La norma anti-elusión del proyecto de nueva ley general tributaria', Revista Estudios Financieros 
2003, no  66 to the opinions of FALCON and Telia, 'El fraude a la Ley tributaria como un mecanismo para gravar determinadas economías de opción (I): su radical 
diferencia con los supuestos previstos en el are  6 C C , Quincena Fiscal 1995, no  17; 'F l fraude a la Ley tributaria como un mecanismo para gravar determinadas 
economías de opción (II): limites a la utilización de esta figura', Quincena Fiscal 1995, no  18 and Juan José Lapatza Ferreiro, 'Economía de opción, fraude de ley, 
sanciones y delito fiscal', Quincena Fiscal 2001, no  8, who are also contrary to such a norm  The resemblance of all the arguments pro and con are stunning, as 
different as the Spanish and the Canadian tax systcms may be  See similar arguments in the rcactions to the UK GAAR proposal put forward by the IFS, Tax 
Avoidance: A repon by the Tax Law Review Committee (IFS, 1997), at Graerne Cooper, 'International experience with general anti-avoidance rules', Southern 
Metbodist University Law Review 2001, no  83  
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2. The common elements of most genera! anti 
avoidance rules 
There are a number of reasons why governments need 
to tackle tax avoidance. The main one is that it distorts 
the allocation of the tax burden among citizens. It is 
then regarded as one of the dangers affecting the 
soundness and coherence of the tax systems, in that 
such phenomena may end tip preven ti ng them from the 
fulfilment of their objectives, partly, because of its 
negative incidence on the main equalky principies (i.e. 
ability to pay, general taxation, etc.). In the end, as the 
Spanish Constitutional Court (TC) put it, it is a zero-
sum game, as 'what remains unpaid by those who 
should have paid it, will eventually have to be paid by 
other citizens that are either more law abiding or have 
less practical possibilities to avoid taxes'.5 
The above considerations are common knowledge 
in the literature of tax avoidance but it is necessary to 
stress the point because anti-avoidance provisions, or 
anti-avoidance case law, when authentic, constitute a 
necessary complement to one of the pillars of a 
taxation system: its equality. Accordingly, it has often 
been understood that such provisions conform a 
constitutional requirement in order to protect the 
equality principies, to the extent that such principies 
are enshrined in the Constitutions.6 
The measures designed to counter tax avoidance do 
not differ greatly. Be it in the form of a GAAR, or the 
consequence of anti-avoidance case law, there are a 
number of common elements that can be traced down 
in every group of measures, in all countries. This is 
consistent with a certa i n level of resemblance in all tax 
systems, at least in the way tax norms are designed. In 
short, most anti-avoidance measures are very similar, 
or at least come to very similar conclusions.7 
The differences among GAARs and case law 
doctrines lay not really in the elements themselves, 
for all of them are more or less common, but on the 
stress or importance given to one of them in detriment 
of the others. Thus, while in Germany special 
importance is given to the misuse or the abuse of the 
legal forms8 (Gestaltungsmibbrauch) that lead to a 
certain arrangement, in the US stress is laid on the 
absence of any valid economic reason (i.e. business 
purpose test) for the adoption of a given legal form or 
arrangement. As I will later show, here too lay the 
main differences between the ECJ concept of tax 
avoidance and the Member States'. 
To the extent that it bestows certain importance on 
form, the Spanish norm may be traditionally closer to 
the Germán. However, it also encapsulates certain 
elements of the business purpose test doctrines. Section 
15 of the LGT mainly refers to a problem of 
interpretation; in which the way the taxpayer has 
interpreted a certain provisión differs, 'confliets', with 
that intended by the purpose of the law. Such a 
conflict9 will arise: 
'when the taxpayer succeeds in total or partially 
avoiding the tax, or obtains a tax benefit of any 
kind through acts or arrangements in which both 
the following circumstances oceur: (a) Individually 
considered or, as a group such acts are clearly 
artificial or improper for attaining the pursued 
economic objective; (b) That no other substantial 
consequences arise from the adoption of this legal 
form or arrangement as would have arisen had the 
normal, proper form be used.' 
The main reason why this norm has been changed 
lays in the disorderly, even erratic, manner in which 
Spanish tax authorities had been interpreting the 
previous tax avoidance provisión, together with the 
rest of the anti-avoidance measures, such as the anti-
sham or simulation provisión or the adequate inter-
pretation provisions. Two main reasons serve to 
explain the almost legendary reluctance to employ 
the provisión: one is that it expressly excluded the 
Opinión no  76/1990, 26 Aprii (FJ  4)  Scc thcsc arguments at: IFS, n  4 abovc, p  4; Juan María Barqero Estevan, La función del tríbulo en el Estado Social y 
Democrático de Derecho (Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 2002), p  81  This is already having a direct incidence in public expenditure, and ¡n that 
way, in the welfare modeis of Member States; see in this regard, ínter alia: Avi-Yonah, 'Globalisation, tax competition, and the fiscal crisis of the Welfare State', 
Harvard Law Review 2000, vol  113, no  7, p  1575; Miguel Ángel Caamaíio Anido and José Manuel Calderón Carrero: 'La erosión de las medidas de control fiscal 
del Estado de residencia: una reflexión al hilo de la jurisprudencia comunitaria en el caso JC/ \ Revista de Contabilidad y Tributación 2000, no 207, p, 245  
Danzer, 1981, p  25; Kirchhof, 1983, p  175; Klaus Tiplee: Die Steuerrecbtsordnung, Verlag Dr  Orto Schmidt, vol  III, p  1330; Dieter Birk: Steuerrecbt I. 
Allgemeines Steuerrecbt, Verlag C H  Beck (München, 1994), pp  106 and 107; Uwc Paschcn (2001): Steuerumgebung im nationalen una internationalen Steuerrecbt, 
Verlag GmbH (Wiesbaden, Deutscher Universitáts, 2001), p  55  Scc this idea in the Germán Constitutional Court (BverfG, hereafter) of 2 October 1968 - 1 BvF 3/ 
65, BVerfGE 24, 174, and the Spanish TC , vid. Opinions nos  76/1990, 46/2000 and 194/2000  See José Manuel Calderón Carrero (2000a): 'Aspectos internacionales 
del fraude y la evasión fiscal', at C  García Novoa and A  López Diaz: Temas de Derecho Penal Tributario (Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2000), p  204  
Fernando García Prats: 'Las medidas tributarias anti-abuso y el Derecho Comunitario', at: Serrano Antón and Soler Roch: Las medidas anti-abuso en la normativa 
interna española y en los convenios para evitar la doble imposición internacional y su compatibilidad con el Derecho Comunitario (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 
Madrid, 2002), p  164 maintains a different view, on the grounds of the works of Avery Jones et al., 'The business purpose test and abuse of rights', British Tax 
Review 1985, no  2 and Coopcr, see n  4 above  In my opinión, precisely those studies point to the opposite conclusión; that there are fundamental coincidenccs in 
all general anti-avoidance rules  Avery Jones et al. pointed to the similarities, in the results, of anti-avoidance theories and provisions in continental and common 
law (p  76)  Almost 20 years after that wotk, their similarities are specially intense, see in this regard: IFS, n  4 above; Cooper, n  4 above, pp  97-108; Violeta Ruiz 
Almendral and Georg Seitz: 'El fraude a la ley tributaria (análisis de la norma española con avuda de la experiencia alemana)' Revista Estudios Financieros 2004, 
pp  257-258  
Section 42 1 of the AO 'Tax law cannot be circumvented by the abuse of legal constructions  In the case of an abuse, tax vvill be due as if a legal arrangement, which 
is adequate to the cconomie substance of the arrangement, had taken place'; see Ruiz Almendral at n  7 above and also 'Die neue spanische Umgehungsvorschrift 
des Art, 15 Ley General Tributaria (LGT) - Ist der deutsche s  42 AO ais Vorbild geeignet?', Steuer und Wirtschaft 2004, no  4  
The term 'conflict', cmploycd for the first time by the LGT 2003, is somewhat deceptive, in that it may mislead the interpretation of the provisión, which is an anti-
avoidance provisión in its own right, not a mere description of a conflict; Palao Taboada, see n  4 above, p  73; Ruiz Almendral, see n  8 above, p  16  
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possibility of sanctioning taxpayers incurring in ít, the 
second is that the provisión has always required tax 
authorities to rollow a special procedure in order to 
guarantee its correct and unified interpretation. In 
practice, tax authorities and the courts have circum-
vented the provisión and recharacterized certain 
arrangements by re-interpreting them in the light of 
the tax norms, or declaring the existence of sham. To a 
certain extent, this practice has constituted an 
avoidance of the tax avoidance provisión in its own 
right.10 The present provisión no longer requires tax 
authorities to follow a special process, although a 
consultative commission must decide whether or not 
the different elements of tax avoidance are present (s. 
159).11 However, the new LGT makes it even harder to 
clifferentiate between avoidance and sham or simula-
non, regulated in s. 16. This matters in Spain, for only 
in the latter cases may the tax authorities impose 
sanctions. In the author's view, the differences among 
sham and avoidance are not really ontological, as they 
share the same naturé, differing only in the degree of 
bluntness or sophistication that the avoidance transac-
tion has been dressed up vvith.12 
Of course different reasons may explain vvhy a 
GAAR is used or not. In the cases of Spain, the 
situation can be qualifíed as a failure of the provisión, 
which was systematically 'avoided' by the authorities. 
In ocher countries, an adequate interpretation of the 
tax norms mav make it unnecessary.1'' 
A. The structure of tax avoidance: ¡s there a 'ríght' 
to save taxes? 
According to the classical design of taxes, the burden 
usually t'alls on an economic reality that has previously 
been regulated, classified or characterised by other 
branches of law (commerce or other prívate law). 
Because citizens are free to choose anv lesa] form 
among a panoply of options, they are indirectly bound 
to have an influence upon their final tax debt, or on 
whether or not the debt will actually arise.14 Therefore, 
there is no such thing as a right to avoid or minimise 
taxes. The possibility of diminishing the tax burden by 
employing a certain legal form instead of another is a 
mere natural consequence of the common structure of 
taxes as we know them. Moreover, as U. Paschen put 
it, the (famous) statement that 'every taxpayer is 
entitled to arrange his affairs in order to pay the 
minimal possible tax' is only strict truth for those cases 
where the tax norm expressly establishes an incentive/ 
disincentive. For the normal tax burden, that statement 
would be the exception.15 In short, legitímate tax 
micigation or tax planning [economía de opción, 
Steuerverrneidung) is nothing more than a side effect 
or an iridirect consequence from the exercise of the free 
will in a market economy. 
That avoiding taxes is not a right may seem quite 
obvious at first sight. If taxes are a democratically 
agreed collective contribution to the financing of 
public expenditures, why then should there be a right 
ro avoid them? However, this conclusión has often 
been jumped to when analysing the core structure of 
taxes. The most quoted example of such idea can be 
found in Duke of Westminster, which constitutes a 
good example of the so-called 'pro-taxpayer lítera-
lism',16 which has also had a decisive influence 
outside the UK. For example, ít was this line of 
thought that virtually deprived the Australian GAAR 
of 1936 of any effectiveness, which led to its reform in 
1981,17 as well as the reform of the Acts Interpretation 
Act in order to enhance the use of purposive 
interpretation by the courts, thus making up for the 
said literalism.18 And this is not just a matter of 
terminology. When what is only a natural conse-
quence of taxation is turned into a 'right', thus 
missing the nuances, taxpayers feel entitled to pursue 
it - as they would pursue any other right - and 
Palao, sec n  4 above  
See Ruiz Almendral and Seitz, n  7 above  Whether or not that process is accually necessary, is not quite clear; see Jesús López Tello(2003): 'La "cláusula antiabuso" 
del anteproyecto de la nueva ley general tributaria', Actualidad jurídica Una & Menéndez 2003, no  5, p  53  
Most Spanish scholars do not share this view, and maintain the existence of a difference; Ínter alia: Juan Zornoza Pérez: 'La simulación en Derecho Tributario', 
Boletín del Ilustre Colegio de Abogados de Madrid 2000, no  16  
See the Canadian case, where to the moment fcw cases have rnade it to the courts; Arnold, see n  4 and also 'The Canadian General Anti-Avoidance Rule', in 
Graeme S  Cooper (ed ): Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (International Bureau of Fiscal Documentación, Amsterdam, 1997); IFS, see n  4, p  23  
Rainer W  Walz: Steuergerechtigkeit und Rechisanivendung. Gntndlinien einer reiativ autonomen Steuerrechtsdogmatik (Decker, Heidelberg, 1980), p  227; 
Danzer, 1981, p  105; Tiplee, n  6 above, pp  1329 and 1330; Paschen, n, 6 above, pp  41 and 42  
Paschen, see n  6 above, p  103  
Comrnissioners of Inland Revenue v Duke of Westminster [1936] App  Cas  1  Karsten Nevermann: Justiz und Steuerumgehung (Ein kritischer Vergleich der 
Haltung der Dritten Gewalt zu kreativer steuerlicher Gestaltung in GroKbritannien und Deutschland) (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1994), p  298  See a strong and 
somewhat grotesque defense of such literal pro-taxpayer interpretación at Lord Houghton of Souwerby: Tax Avoision. The Fuliliy of Taxation by Menaces (1979), 
p  93. See abundant examples, and a critic, of this view of tax avoidance as a sort of right at: Cooper, n  4 above, p  86  
The Income Tax Assesrnent Act 1936 was subject to a reform; scc in detail: John Passant: 'Tax Avoidance in Australia: The Return of the Ghost?', Britisb Tax 
Review 1996, no  4, p  453; Frans Vanisrendael: 'Judicial interpretation and the role of anti-abuse provisions in Tax Law', Graeme S  Cooper (ed ): Tax Avoidance 
and the Rule of Law. Amsterdam: International Burean of Fiscal Documentation, Amsterdam, 1997), pp. 141—142  
Accs Interpretation Act 1901, s  15AA(1), which states: 'In the interpretation of a provisión of an Act, a construcción that would promote the purpose or object 
underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construcción that would not promote that purpose or 
object'  
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aggrcssive tax planning ensues.19 It is then forgotten 
that 'The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the 
amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or 
altogether avoid them' is only possible when under-
taken 'by means which the law permits'.20 In the end, 
to name what is nothing more than the natural 
consequence - a decrease in the tax debt - of an 
option — to choose one legal form or another — a right, 
departs from an 'underlying assumption.. .that the 
tax laws are confiscations of prívate property, 
interferences with the natural order of the free 
market, and violations of civil l iberty. . . ' what 
constitutes, 'a nineteenth century relie'.21 
What qualifies a certain arrangement as tax 
avoidance is the abuse, the misinterpretation or the 
manipulation of those legal forms, to the extent that 
they are taken into account by the tax norrns. Henee, 
while legitimare tax planning is not against the purpose 
of the tax laws, tax avoidance complies only literally 
with such laws, albeit not in spirit.22 There are three 
basic elements in every avoidance arrangement: the 
legal means, form or arrangement employed to attain a 
given objective is not adequate justification; the only 
reason such an arrangement was entered into at all was 
to reduce taxes and there is no other substantial reason 
(safe harbour rules) or valid motive to justify its 
employment. These three elements are closely related, 
and must always be present at the same time. For the 
sake of clarity, I will treat them in a sepárate manner, 
as artificial as such a treatment may be, for in the 
logical argumentation process the interpreter should 
deal with all three elements in a circular manner. 
B. Testíng the form: an artificias, strange, 
inadequate or contríved legal form or 
arrangement 
Section 15.1 of the LGT refers to acts or arrangements 
that are 'clearly artificial or improper for attaining the 
pursued economic objective' as opposed to some '(h) 
proper form' that could have been used. This is 
common to many GAARs, precisely because taxes 
derive from the use of a number of legal forms 
(arrangements, contraets, businesses), stress is put on 
the form itself.23 Should this be inappropriate to the 
means and objectives, there will be some hint or 
indication of tax avoidance. Actually, the most 
common form of tax avoidance will derive from an 
abuse of the freedom of forms for the purpose of tax 
mitigation. 
As clear as this may be in the theory, the question 
remains of exactly what can be considered inappropri-
ate, which leads to the question: in comparison with 
what should this form be considered inadequate. 
Merely stating that it is artificial, strange or unusual 
does not add much information, as these are all relative 
concepts. That could be, at the most, a primary or 
possible evidence of avoidance.24 Another criterion can 
be the 'third rational person' (Verstándiger Dritte), 
which is equivalent to saying that the form does not 
make much sense by itself, unless vve connect it with 
the obtaining of a tax benefit. This way of arguing 
requires the establishment of an ideal standard which 
serves as a comparison point, in order to establish a 
relationship between the economic objective and the 
legal means.25 In this regard, the term 'artificiar, 
meaning a lack of logical and coherent correspondence 
of the arrangement and the underlying economic 
reality is more precise, and is most used by GAARs 
(such as the Australian, ' . . . blatant, artificial or 
contrived arrangements . . . ' ) . 2 6 
Whatever criterion we decide to choose, it is most 
important to bear in mind that the comparison 
perspective must always reside in the tax norm or 
provisión. What should be the main object of 
examination is not so much whether or not the legal 
form is logically adequate to the economic objective 
that is being seeked, as much as this can be taken into 
account as a possible evidence, but whether or not such 
an arrangement or legal form is in accordance with the 
tax provisión itself. The purpose and significance of the 
tax measures must be the main element of comparison. 
The act or arrangement must be analysed as defined, 
Many examples serve to prove this point; following the Stubart case (Stnbart Investments Ltd v The Queen [1984] C T C  294), Reverme Canadá decided to publish 
a declaración of rights for the raxpayers, including the 'right to arrange your affairs in order to pay the minimum tax required by law'  This stacement, followed by 
a strong tendency of litoral interpretación of tax stacutes led to a grcat increase to all sores of tax avoidance arrangements or aggressive tax planning, vvhich actually 
brought about a decrease of the revenues obtained by the corporation income tax between 1985 and 1987  This gave place to the final enaetment of the ( ' 'anadian 
GAAR; (s  245 of the Income Tax Acr (Statues Canadá 1970, chapter 63)  See more details in Arnold, n  4 above, pp  543 and 549 and Arnold again at n  13 above, 
p  230  Something very similar happened in Belgium, that  also enacted a GAAR (by an Act of 22 July 1993); see Luc Hinnekens: 'Uncertainties in the Interpretador! 
of the General Anti-Avoidance Statute', European Taxation, September 1999, p  339  
Gregory v Heivering, 293 US 465 (1935)  
P  Hogg and J E  Magce: Principies of (.'anadian Income Tax IJIIV (Carswell, Toronto, 1996), p  447; Ruiz Almendral and Seitz, see n  7 above  
Hensel, 1923, p  244; Tipke, see n  6 above, p  1325; Birle, see n  6 above, p  106; IFS, see n  4 ahove, p  ¡x; Palao Taboada , see n  4 above, p  79; Abelardo Delgado 
Pacheco: Las Normas Antiehtsián en la Jurisprudencia Tributaria española (Thomson-Aranzadi, Pamplona, 2004), p  43  
IFS: see n  4 above, p  21 and pp  56—57  
Henee the confusión in Germany thac has derived from certain line of case law that identified, in a more or less direct way, the term 'inappropriate' (unattgemessen) 
with '«inusual' {unüblicb/ungewóhnlich); see in this regard: Petcr Fischer: 'Dio Umgehung des Steuergesetzes', Der Betrieb, 29 March 1996, p  647 ; Paschen, see n  6 
above, p  15  
(Verstandige Dritte) This criterion is employed, Ínter alia, in: BFH 27 July 1999, BStBl 11 1999, 769  
Passant, see n  17 above, pp  453 and 454; IFS, see n  4 above, pp  38 and 39; G T  Pagone: 'Anti-Avoidance Provisions and Tax Reform', Australia» Tax Reivew 
2001, p  81  
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considered or taken into account by the tax provisión. 
The coherence must be looked for inside the tax norms, 
not outside. Such reference point is made clear in the 
Cañadian GAAR, which prohibits the 'misuse of the 
provisions of this Act or an abuse having regard to the 
provisions of this Act, other than this section, read as a 
vvhoie'.2' The Spanish and Germán rules do not 
expressly say anything, but that has also been the 
prevailing interpretation among commentators.28 
In this analysis it is necessary to take into account 
the purpose of the tax norm and, specifically, whether 
or not that norm provides an incentive for that 
arrangement. Thus, once we know exactly what the 
purpose of the tax norm that has been avoided — or of 
the tax norm establishing a benefit that has been 
strived for - the following questions remain: whether 
or not the tax provisión has influenced the behaviour 
of the taxpayers and, specifically, whether that 
influence is consistent vvith the objectives and purposes 
of the Act. 
This of course means that it will be essential to 
determine whether the tax provisión intends to be 
neutral or not, with regard to that specific arrangement 
(for 'chemically puré" taxes do not really exist). As a 
general departíng point, where there is a neutral tax 
provisión, a tax-influenced behaviour stands a good 
chance of being an avoidance (tax driven) transaction. 
On the contrary, if the tax norm is dírectly neutral, the 
exam must focus on whether or not the act or 
arrangement complies with what that provisión 
intended to encourage/discourage. It is then easy to 
see how neutrality in tax systems constitutes a breeding 
ground for the proliferation of tax avoidance.29 
C. Testíng the substance; no other valia economic 
reason or the business parpóse test 
Once there is an artificial form leading to a tax benefit, 
it must he analysed whether there were other teasons 
for its adoption. Of course if there were, then maybe 
the form is not actually artificial after all, which shows 
how the analysis must be circular. Section 15 of the 
LGT expressly refers to the use of a legal form from 
which derive 'no other substantial consequences' 
leaving aside the tax benefit strived for. This provisión 
is a form of business purpose test.30 The idea is to deny 
legal protection — i.e. granting a tax benefit — to those 
transactions or arrangements deprived of any eco-
nomic purpose which have (maybe precisely as a 
consequence of not having any business purpose, 
maybe not) abused the norms of public law (tax law) 
and of prívate law in the sense of using them only for 
the purpose of obtaíning a tax benefit, as the purpose 
of privare law is not to guarantee tax benefits but to 
facilítate economic transactions. 
Thus, valid economic reasons is both a criterion to 
determine whether or not the form is artificial, or once 
concluded the form is maybe not artificial but 
contrived, etc., a way to save it from incurring in tax 
avoidance. 
But s. 15 of the LGT goes further than merely 
determining a business purpose in the transaction. The 
idea is to find out whether or not the form complies 
with the purpose of the tax norm. A transaction may 
be perfectly sound in these terms and still be an 
avoidance transaction. It is important to take this 
element into account, for the obtaining of a tax benefit 
may be by itself a perfectly sound commercial 
objective. Sometimes it is easy to miss this nuance, 
and accept arrangements entered into for the solé 
purpose of avoiding taxes, arguing that the tax benefits 
were also a part of the objective of the business, and 
that it is only normal to want to minimise costs, and 
among these costs, those derived from taxes. An 
example of this reasoning can be found in the Spodess 
case, as resolved by the Australian Federal Court. The 
reasoning was corrected afterwards by the Supreme 
Court, in the sense defended here, by stating that: 
'a particular course of action may be. . .both "tax 
driven and bear the character of a rational 
commercial decisión. The presence of the latter 
characteristic does not determine the answer to the 
question whether, within the meaning of Part IV.a 
[which is the Australian GAAR], a person entered 
into or carried out a " transact ion" for the 
"dominant purpose" of enabling the tax payer to 
obtain a "tax benefit".'31 
This last Court places particular emphasis on the 
fact that there is no necessary or logical dichotomy 
among an arrangement carried out for tax reasons or 
tax driven and rational commercial decisions, so the 
measuring standard must preferentially lie in analysing 
whether the operation does make sense or can be 
understood if we forget about the tax benefits. If we 
elimínate the tax benefit, the arrangement would not 
have been reasonable. It then naturally follows that its 
objective was purely to obtain a tax benefit. If that tax 
The Canadian GAAR is contained in s  245 of the income T a x Act ( RSC 1985, c  1 (5th Supp))  
Fischer, see n  24 above, p  648 ; Paschen, see n  6 above, p  93; Uwe Clausen: 'Struktur und Rechtsfolgen des § 42 AO' , Der Betrieb, 25 July 2003, pp  1591 and 
1592; in Spain this idea was stressed in the special repon prior to the reform of the tax code: Informe LGT: 2001, p  44  In the samescnsc, see: López Tello, scc n  II 
above, p  50  
Paschen, see n  6 above, pp  47, 48 and 57  
Palao: 'Los "motivos económicos válidos" en el régimen fiscal de las reorganizaciones empresariales', Revista Estudios Financieros 2002, no  2, p  81; López Tello, 
see n  11 above, pp  51 and 52; Ruiz Almendral and Seitz, see n  7 above  
FCT v Spotless Services Ltd (19S5| (Federal Court), see more references and a critic at Passant, n  16 above, p  453  The second pan of the case took place at the 
Australian Supreme Court FCT v Spotless 95 A T C  4775; see: Passant, n  16 above, p  131 and Pagone, see n  26 above, pp  83 and 84  
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benefít was not intended by the tax norm, i.e. there is 
not a safe harbour, it.should be disregarded on the 
grounds that it constitutes an avoidance transaction. 
That is the underlying rational of all GAARs 
mentioned here. It is also present in the objectives of 
the tax shelters legislation in the US.32 
D. Testing the resulte: the tax benefít 
Merely using a contrived or artificial arrangement does 
not lead to tax avoidance unless this is clearly 
connected to the obtaining of a tax benefít of any 
kind. This connection is expressly stated in s. 15 of the 
LGT, as well as in raost GAARs.33 A tax benefít refers 
to any situation deriving in less taxes, be it in the form 
of lower tax rates, the application of deductions, the 
deferral of taxes, etc. The main thing is that there must 
exist a clear and logical link between the. obtaining of 
the benefít and the arrangements that have been 
carried out. Such benefits do not need to have been 
fully accrued, it will suffice if they are 'reasonably 
expected' in relationship with the scheme, something 
referred to with regard to the Australian GAAR 
proposal as the 'reasonable hypothesis' test.34 
E. The irrelevant role of testing the subjective 
intention or how form reveáis parpóse 
Tax avoidance is a purpose-based notion in the sense 
that there must be a clear and logical connection 
among all its elements, that are therefore oriented and 
directed to the obtaining of a tax benefít. But this does 
not mean that subjective intention should be proved. 
As Cooper pnts it, purpose can only be inferred from 
the taxpayer's actions: 'form reveáis purpose'.35 The 
fact is, however, that whether or not the subjective 
intention of the taxpayer should count, and if so, to 
what extent, is still the object of much dispute. To 
some, the author included, it is perfectly irrelevant, to 
others, it is an essential element for the adequate 
functioning of anti-avoidance provisions.'6 To a 
certain extent, the discussion is perfectly useless, for 
most of those favouring the 'subjective' element admit 
that it can only be proved with reference to the rest of 
the (objective) elements of tax avoidance. Section 15 of 
the LGT does point to the intention of the parts, but 
this should be understood as a reference to the 
purpose, not the motive?7 As P. Millet illustrates the 
point, 'if a man points a loaded revolver at another's 
head and pulís the trigger, his motive may be greed, or 
jealousy, or revenge; his purpose is to kill; the effect is 
the victim's death . Only the two second elements 
matter in the field of tax avoidance. 
F. Purposive interpretation and tax avoidance: 
why shouid a GAAR be necessaryt 
The first and most important common element to all 
GAARs is that they provide an instrument for the tax 
administración to recharacterize a given arrangement 
by interpreting the tax legislation according to its 
purpose. To that extent, it has been often pointed out 
that excessive literalism when interpreting tax legisla-
tion, together with an excess of formalism when taking 
into account legal forms as defined in prívate law 
constitute one of the most important breeding grounds 
for the proliferation of tax avoidance schemes.39 As U. 
Paschen put it, regarding s. 42.1 of the AO, but clearly 
applicable to other GAARs, such a provisión: 
'finds itself in a dialectic relationship between the 
freedom of legal forms or free will in prívate lay, on 
the one hand, and the abilíty to pay principies on 
the other, which at the same time is a clear 
reflection of the existing tensión between the formal 
and the material rule of law.'40 
In short, the key to adequately countering tax 
avoidance lays in the interpretation of the tax statutes. 
The structure of thc Corporate Tax Shelters is slightly different, as ic departs from a quantitacive test, by comparing che expected benefits with the expected tax 
benefits, I will not deal with this interesting legislación here, see ínter alia: Cooper, n  4 above, p  108 and other references quoted there  
IFS, see n  4 above; Ruiz Almendral and Seitz, n  7 above  
The 'Ralph proposal\ that never actually made ir to Parliament but was subject to great discussions, intended to increase the concept of tax benefit, not only by 
linking it closer to the transaction, but by expanding it to all kings of tax deferrals; see more información at: Pagone, see n  26 above, pp  85 and 86  
Cooper, see n  4 above, p  100  
While Birk, see n  6 above, p  108; Passchen, see n  6 above, pp  19 and 20; Clausen, see n  28 above, p  1593 or Palao Taboada: 'Algunos problemas que plantea la 
aplicación de la norma española sobre el fraude a la ley tributaria', Crónica Tributaria 2001, no  98, p  131 consider it irrelevant, Falcón and Telia, see n  4 above, p  
8 and Ferreiro Lapatza: 'El abuso en la aplicación de la norma tributaria en el Anteproyecto de Ley General Tributaria ' , Quincena Fiscal 2003, no  11, p  11 have 
maintained its importance  Tipke, at n  6 above, p  1341 maintains the existence of the subjective intention, but docs not consider ic necessary to prove ic 
independently from the objective elements  
Palao Taboada, see n  4 above, p  77; in order co fully assess this difference, the work of Avery Jones, 'Nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes ic so - che 
mental element in anti-avoidance legislation (1), Briiish Tax Keview 1983, p  18 is a must  See also thc distinction becween motive and purpose, with abundant 
references to the US case law, at: Martin J  McMahon Jr : 'Beyond a GAAR: retrofitting the code co rewind in 21st century tax shelters', Tax Notes, 17 March 2003, 
p  1733  
Pecer Millett: 'Artificial Tax Avoidance  The English and American Approach', British Tax Keview, 1986, p  330  
Walz, see n  14 above, p  226; Danzer, p  105; Fischer, see n  24 above, p  10; Andrés Báez Moreno: Normas Contables y Normas Fiscales en la determinación de la 
base imponible del impuesto sobre sociedades (Aranzadi, Pamplona, 2005 (fortheoming)); Ruiz Almendral and Zornoz Pérez: 'Interpretación, calificación, 
integración y medidas anti-elusión en la Ley 58/2003, de  17 de diciembre, General Tributaria', Estudios de Derecho Judicial 2005, no  57  
Paschen, see n  6 above, p  19  
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Purposive interpretation is then the main instrument to 
recharacterize abusive transactions.41 This is a very 
important departing point for anti-avoidance doc-
trines, such as the business purpose test that I wíll deal 
with later. Its cornerstone is co regard taxation as a 
mainly practica! subject, based on certain uuderlying 
commercial and economic flows that must always be 
taken into account.42 By the same token, a GAAR is 
unsuitable to solve structural problems of a tax syscem. 
ín those cases, only a ref'orm of the pertinent law or 
provisión can solve the problem. 
But interpretation alone will not always be enough 
to solve an avoidance situation. There are different 
means to curb avoidance transactions. Most of the 
time, an adequate interpretation will suffice to that 
end. To adequately recharacterize an operation, by 
interpreting both the pertinent tax provisions and the 
arrangements carried out by the parties will serve to 
guarantee an adequate (fairer, etc.) distribution of the 
tax burden. But the words cannot be interpreted ad 
infinitum and in an área that falls within the rule of 
law the interpreter, the tax authorities in this case, 
cannot go beyond the possible sense or meaning 
(Wortsinn) of the words, although they may, or even 
must, go beyond their literal meaning (Wortlaut).43 
The words may clearly allow for the tax regime that 
the avoider was seeking for to apply, but not the 
purpose of the tax norm taken as a whole. There will 
be avoidance cases where the ploy invented by the 
parties fall perfectly within the scope of the meaning of 
the words, and even to a certain excent, ro i es 
significance. If that is che case, merely interpreting 
the words of the stacute will not help. A reorganisation 
carried out for the only purpose of avoiding taxes, may 
in principie be a reorganisacion in all its elements, the 
actual shares were exchanged, the flows of monies did 
oceur and nothing was by itself artificial or oucside the 
literal meaning of the statutes. Either the court 
develops a very elabórate purpose-oriented interpreta-
tion and disregards the operation for tax purposes, if it 
does not fit the objectives of the tax free regime, or, if 
che coures are not clearly used to interpreting tax 
norms in such a way, but racher to depart from or take 
as valid operations that, from an strictly prívate law 
point of view are perfectly valid, then a GAAR will be 
necessary, as only such a provisión can help re-
establish the adequate order of law and ignore the 
operation only with regard to the taxes to be applied to 
it. In short, a GAAR implies taking a step further from 
interpretation, take a distance from the tax provisión 
itself and consider both the tax norm and the 
arrangements as a whole. If the elements previously 
analysed are present, then the tax authorities may 
disregard the operation for tax purposes. 
In the Spanish context, a GAAR is especially 
necessary, given the strong tendeney of the courts, and 
the tax administration, either to carry out a very literal 
approach to the interpretation of tax norms, or to 
reason that a certain arrangement or act is an avoidance 
act, but without actually applying the anti-avoidance 
provisión, which among other effeets, diminíshes the 
principie of legal certainty.44 In many cases, che 
confusión has lead co admitting the possibility of 
imposing sanctions to tax avoidance schemes, despite 
the fact that both the previous as the present Spanish 
GAAR expressly reject that possibility.45 
On the other hand, GAARs also serve other 
functions, such as being a sort of guideline for the 
courts, créate an ad terrorem effect on taxpayers, 
enhance the certainty of the law by clearly establishing 
the consequences for the taxpayer and, as s. 15 of the 
LGT does, the process that the tax administration 
must follow in order to recharacterize a given 
arrangement.40 En passant, these arguments also serve 
as an answer to the 'mantra-like' repeated claim that 
GAARs are too vague or imprecise to meet the strict 
standards of the rule of law. As Cooper points out, the 
claim has becorne so universal that most commentators 
do not even bother explaining exactly why it is that 
they should be so imprecise.47 On the contrary, the fact 
is that there are sufficient elements that bring a great 
amount of precisión to these provisions. 
Nonetheless, as I pointed out in the introducción to 
this article, these are harsh times for GAARs. On the 
one hand, an ever more complicated international 
context is increasingly moving governments to design 
and apply specific anti-avoidance rules, that may 
simplify the work of tax authorities. This of course 
poses new questions as to how exactly these rules 
relate to international treaties.48 On the other hand, 
the scope of GAARs is also being questioned as a 
consequence of European law, and specifically, as we 
IFS, see n  4 above, pp  9 and 10  Scc chis idea at che Canadian Supremo Court's case Stubart Investments Ltd. v The Queen (1984) CTC 294; see also, ínter alia, 
Arnold, n  4 above, p  542; Vaniscendael, 'Legal framework for taxation' in Thuronyi (ed )¡ Tax Law Design and Drafting (Kluwer Law, The Hague, 2000), pp  54 
and 55; Cooper, see n  4 above, p  85  
Milletr, see n  38 above, p  331  
Claus Wilhelm Canaris: Die Feststellung van Liicken im Gesetz (Duncker & Humblot  Berlín, 1983), pp  88 and 89  
Scc many examples, ínter alia, in Zornoza Pérez, ti  12 above; Palao, see ns  4 and 8 above; Ruiz Almendral and Seitz, n  7 above  
See examples at: García Novoa: La cláusula antielusiva (Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2004); Báez Moreno and Hugo López : 'Nuevas perspectivas generales sobre la 
elusión fiscal y sus consecuencias en la derivación de responsabilidades penales: a propósito de la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 30 de abril de 200 ?', Revista 
Estudios Financieros 2004  
See these arguments, ínter alia, in: Arnold, n  4 above, p  553; IFS, n  4 above; Cooper, n  4 above, p  88  
Cooper, n  4 above, p  93  
I will leave the study of these problems out, as it clearly surpasses the scope of this arricie  On chis regard, see, Ínter alia: Adolfo j  Martín Jiménez, 'Domestic Anti-
Abuse Rules and Double Taxation Trcaties: a Spanish Perspective', I and II, Bulletin. International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 2002, nos  II and 12  
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will now see, as a consequence of the ECJ case law on 
this matter. 
3. Tax avoidance in the European context 
Direct taxes may not have been harmonised (yet), but 
many of their features have already been the subject of 
a certain level of indirect harmonisation via the ECJ 
case law, which basically derives from the obligation, 
for all Member States, to exercise their tax authority in 
compliance with the non-discrimination principie. 
Furthermore, the Court. has made it clear that: 
'the prohibition on Member States establishing 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment also 
applies to tax provisions. According to consistent 
case-law, even if, in the current state of Community 
law, direct taxation does not as such fall within the 
scope of the Community's jurisdiction, Member 
States must nevertheless exercise their retained 
powers in compliance with Community law.'49 
In a nutshell, the freedoms constitute 'authentic rights 
to access the markets of the different Member States in 
conditions identical to the national economic agents, 
which implies the elimination of all discriminatory 
rules and of burdens of any kind that, in the tax arena, 
may be imposed upon the actors of cross borders 
operations'.50 It is important to bear in mind this last 
sentence, for it is only from this perspective that the 
ECJ case law on tax avoidance may be fully under-
stood. Along this line, the ECJ has often rejected tax 
measures that, albeit not directly discriminatory, were 
regarded as 'burdens' restricting the free access to the 
European markets.'*1 
The full extent and consequences of this case law is 
not easy to assess, for it is not always clear when a 
given tax norm or provisión may fall under that 
doomed área and be considered against EU law. One 
of the major problems in interpreting the ECJ 
Decisions is the growingly blurred distinction between 
restrictive and discriminatory measures.52 The differ-
ence in their tax regime is crucial, as the first can only 
be justified by the reasons expressly admitted in the 
Treaty, while restrictive measures can only be accepted 
under certain circumstances of general public interest. 
The concept of restriction can be easily applied to a 
cross-border movement, but it is not always under-
standable with regat'd to a taxing regime that involves 
many different and interrelated taxable facts, unless we 
maintain a nineteenth century concept of tax that 
merely views it as a burden. This of course entails that 
the reasoning when examining one or the other be 
totally different: while the principie of non-discrimina-
tion requires the comparison of situations, the non-
restriction approach merely needs to analyse whether 
the measure is, directly or indirectly, an obstacle, and 
whether that can be accepted by the existence of an 
exemption.-^3 This distinction is easier when applied to 
indirect taxes, among other reasons, because of the 
structure of the Treaty.54 But the most relevant 
consequence, totally pertinent to our analysis, is that 
the non-discrimination approach allows for a much 
greater leeway for Member States to develop, and 
therefore also to protect, their tax systems. As F. 
Vanistendael very graphically explains, the restriction 
concept: 
'views the EU market as a huge snooker table, 
where all the economic balls roll smoothly from one 
córner to the other. In the non-discrimination 
approach it is sufficient that cach snooker player 
can play under the same conditions at different 
snooker tables. In the non-restriction approach all 
players are playing from different corners at the 
same snooker table.'55 
In practice, though, the differences among the two 
approaches has been blurred by the ECJ case law. 
Another problem that arises when analysing the ECJ 
case law is that, especially in the field of direct taxes, 
the Court often eludes qualifying a given measure as 
discriminatory but simply analyses whether it can be 
justified or not on the grounds of the general interest, 
which of course only adds to the confusión. Among the 
general interest exceptions that may justify a given tax 
provisión, the Court has dealt with the need to establish 
Ínter alia: C-279/93, Schumacker para  21; C-264/96, IC1, para  19; C-436/00 X ana Y if para  32, C-9/02, Lasteyrie du Saiilant, para  44  
Calderón Carrero and Martin Jiménez: 'Jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas en materia de IRPF', AAVV: Manual del Impuesto 
sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid (fortheoming)), p  4  For a thorough analysis on the Court's case law on chis issue, see: 
Martín Jiménez and Calderón Carrero: Imposición Directa y no discriminación comunitaria (EDERSA, Madrid, 2000), p  87; Calderón Carrero: 'Algunas 
consideraciones en torno a la interrelación entre los convenios de doble imposición y el derecho comunitario: ¿hacia la 'comunítarización' de los CDIs?', Crónica 
Tributaria 2002, nos  102 and 103, p  23  
Thcre is abundant literature on the ECJ case law in chis arca; Ínter alia: Caamaño Anido, Calderón Carrero and Martin Jiménez: jurisprudencia del Tribuna! de 
Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas (1996-!999)(LÚ Ley, Madrid, 2000), p  237; Ruiz Almendral: 'El Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas en el proceso 
de armonización fiscal en la Unión Europea", Revista Española de Derecho Europeo 2002, no  3, p  432  
Whether or not this distinction should be made at all is still the object of much controversy, as shown: CALDERÓN CARRERO; MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ: 2004, 77  
footnotes 92 and 93)  
VAN1STENDAEL: 2003, 137  
VANLSTENDAEL: 2003, 138; the author shows a number of inconsistencics of applying both criteria, or a mixture of them, to direct taxes; see also: Calderón 
Carrero and Martin Jiménez: 'Las normas antiparaíso fiscal españolas y su compatibilidad con el derecho comunitario: el caso especifico de Malta y Chipre tras la 
adhesión a la Unión Europea', Crónica Tributaria 2004, no  111, p  77  
Vanistendael: 'The comparibility of the basic economic freedoms with the sovereign national tax systems of the Member States', EC Tax Review 2003, no  3, p  139  
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tax controls, the need to curb tax avoidance, or to 
guarantee the coherence of the tax system. The need to 
safeguard tax revenues has also been examined, but 
never accepted as a justification in this regard.56 
Furthermore, in the last decade, a large number of 
specific anti-avoidance measures have been the target 
of a series of ECJ's decisions, to the point that it is not 
clear exactly what the future for some of these 
measures may be.57 At this moment there is no legal 
definition of tax avoidance in any EU norm. At least, 
not formally, for the directives that expressly mention 
the concept mereíy establish the basis for Member 
States to introduce and apply their own anti-avoidance 
rules. However, at the same time they also set the 
boundaries for the establishment of such rules.58 Thus, 
Art. 1.2 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (90/435/ 
EEC) allows Member States 'the application of 
domestic or agreement-based provisions required for 
the prevention of fraud or abuse', while Art. 27.1 of the 
Sixth Directive (77/388/EEC) allows them 'to intro-
duce special measures for derogation from the provi-
sions of this Directive, in order to simplify the 
procedure for charging the tax or to prevent certain 
types of tax evasión or avoidance'. Article 11.1a of the 
Merger Directive (90/434/EEC) goes further and 
introduces the críterion of 'valid commercial reasons', 
stating that: 
'a Member State may refuse to apply or withdraw 
the benefit of all or any part of [the special rules 
applicable to certain qualifying reorganisations] 
where it appears that the merger, división, transfer 
of assets or exchange of shares: (a) has as its 
principal objective or as one of its principal 
objectives tax evasión or tax avoidance; the fact 
that one of the operations referred to in Article 1 is 
not carried out for valid commercial reasons such as 
the restructuring or rationalizatíon of the activities 
of the companies participating in the operation may 
constitute a presumption that the operation has tax 
evasión or tax avoidance as its principal objective or 
as one of its principal objectives.' 
As we will see, departing from these provisions, and in 
the light of the fundamental freedoms, the ECJ has 
actually construed a concept of tax avoidance. 
Thirdly, the Council Directive on a common system 
of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments 
made between associated companies of different 
Member States (20Q3/49/EC), also contains a special 
clause on 'fraud and abuse', which allows the 
application of domestic anti-abuse provisions. Thus, 
Art. 5 establishes that: 
' 1 . This Directive shall not preclude the application 
of domestic or agreement-based provisión required 
for the prevention of fraud or abuse. 2. Member 
States may, in the case of transaction for which the 
principal motive or one of the principal motives is 
tax evasión, tax avoidance or abuse, withdraw the 
benefits of this Directive or refuse to apply this 
Directive.' 
On the other hand, the Council Directive on taxation 
of savings income in the form of interest payments 
(2003/48/EC) does not really mention the concept of 
tax avoidance, but refers to it in a very indirect way. 
First, it allows Member States to 'take all requisite 
measures to prevent infringements of nacional law and 
regulations, in particular in the field of taxation'. The 
second mention is a sort of warning: 'In accordance 
with Article 58(3) of the Treaty, the provisions of 
Member States' tax law designed to counter abuse or 
fraud should not constitute a means of arhitrary 
discrinúnation or a disguised restriction on the free 
movement of capital and payments as established by 
Article 56 of the Treaty'' (author's emphasis). Thirdly, 
the Directive refers to the exchange of information as 
the main instrument to guarantee the effective taxation 
of interest payments. As effective as such exchange 
may be to that end,59 the absence of any reference 
whatsoever to curbing tax avoidance through other 
methods is remarkable. 
Finally, the Mutual Assistance Directive (77/799/ 
EEC) intends to establish a sort of support to help curb 
fraud and avoidance.''0 Of course the Mutual Assis-
tance Directive cannot replace domestic anti-abuse 
rules, but may significantly reinforce them, and has the 
Calderón Carrero and Martín Jiménez, see n  52 above, pp  78-80  
With regard ro the (in)compatibility of Member Stares' anti-treaty shopping measurcs, see: Félix Vega Borrego: Las medidas contra el Treaty Shopping (Instituto de 
Estudios Fiscales, Madrid, 2003), p  350  For the conscquences for the Spanish thin-cap measures, regarded as specific anti-avoidance provisions, see recently: 
Calderón Carrero: Precios de Transferencia e Impuesto sobre Sociedades (Tirant lo blanch, Valencia, 2005), p  53  
A recent analysis of the F CJ in the field of anti-avoidance legislador! can be round at: Calderón Carrero and Martin Jiméniz, see n  50 above, p  62. 
Garcia Prats, see n  7 above, p  204  
See in this regard the comprehensive study of Calderón Carrero: Intercambio de información y fraude fiscal internacional (Centro de Estudios Financieros, Madrid, 
2000), p  31  
The motivación of the Directivy clearly ¡Ilustrares the panorama: 'Whereas practices of tax evasión and tax avoidance extending across the frontiers of Member 
States load to budget losses and violations of the principie of fair taxation and are hable to bring about distortions of capital movements and of conditions of 
competition; whereas they therefore affect the operation of the common market; whereas, for these reasons the Council adopted on 10 February 1975 a resolution 
on the measures to be taken by the Community in order to combat international tax evasión and avoidance (OJ No C 3 5 , 14 2 1975, p l ) ; Whereas the internarional 
nature the problem means that national measures, wliose effect does not extend beyond national frontiers, are insufficient; whereas collaboration betvveen 
administrations on the basis of bilateral agreements is also unable to counter new forms of tax evasión and avoidance, which are increasingly assuming a 
multinational character; whereas collaboration betvveen tax administrations within the Community should therefore be srrengthened in accordance with common 
principies and rules; '  
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clear advantage of being perfectly in line with the 
development of the fundamental freedoms.61 
Despite the fact that the EU law does not directly 
contain its own anti-avoidance provisions, as it merely 
sets the basís for Member States to establish theirs, the 
existing case law on the aforementioned provisions 
points to a concept of tax avoidance. Such a concept, 
of course, has only been construed through a series of 
decisions, which have introduced a de facto harmoni-
sation in this matter. So much ink has already flowed 
on these decisions. In the following lines, I will look 
into this case law only to the extent that it will help 
illuminate the concept of tax avoidance developed by 
the ECJ and contrast it with the concept followed by 
most GAARs. It is true that, at the moment, the Court 
has only ruled against specific anti-avoidance provi-
sions, so that no GAAR has been the direct object of 
any decisión, however, a quick look at how the land 
lies in this matter tells us that the time for the general 
anti-avoidance rules may not be too far. It is then 
pettinent to take a look at what the ECJ has been 
saying about tax avoidance in order to draw the 
pertinent consequences that are bound to affect the 
new Spanish GAAR, and for that matter, most 
European rules along this line. 
In principie, the definitíon of tax avoidance that 
derives from the ECJ case law should only affect those 
cases where a transaction is carried out in a 'European 
context'. However, given the broad interpretation 
developed by the Court with regard to its own scope 
of authority {Leur-Bloem, inter alia), the relevance of 
such a concept is bound to have a greater impact than 
what could be first envisaged. 
As I have mentioned above, the Court fully 
acknowledges that the objective of countering tax 
avoidance is generally accepted by EU law. At the same 
time, the Court has always rejected the argument of 
there being 'a risk' of tax avoidance to establish a 
measure that limits any European fundamental free-
dom.62 However, tax avoidance can act as an 
exemption of general interest in order to justify a 
restriction on a fundamental freedom: 'the need to 
safeguard the cohesión of a tax system, the prevention 
of tax evasión and the effectiveness of fiscal super-
visión constitute overriding requirements of general 
interest capable of justifying a restriction on the 
exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaty'.63 At any rate, anti-avoidance measures of any 
kind must fít within the boundaries of the ECJ doctrine 
on such freedoms. Very often the freedoms opérate as a 
sort of safe harbour rule, which may qualify transac-
tions as 'protected' in ternas of tax avoidance 
measures.64 
A number of different factors determine the final 
argumentation to be followed by the Court. They can 
be summarised as follows. 
« Whether or not the tax avoidance provisión has 
previously been established or authorised in a 
Directive. In practice, the Court has interpreted the 
anti-avoidance measures contained, albeit indir-
ectly, in Directives by developing its own concept 
of tax avoidance. With regard to the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive, where Art. 1.2. clearly states 
that the Directive 'shall not. preclude the applica-
tion of domestic or agreement-based provisions 
required for the prevention of fraud or abuse', the 
Court has limited the interpretation of this clause 
to the content of Art. 3.2 of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive65 by stating that the first Article 'is a 
provisión of principie, the content of which is 
. explained in detail in Article 3(2) thereof. Thus, 
Article 3(2) . . . is aimed in particular at counter-
acting abuse whereby holdings are taken in the 
capital of companies for the solé purpose of 
benefiting from the tax advantages available and 
which are not intended to be lasting. In those 
circumstances, it is not appropriate to refer to 
Article 1(2) of the Directive in interpreting Article 
3(2)' (Denkavit, accumulated cases C-283/94, C-
291/94 and C-292/94, para. 31 (author's empha-
sis)). It has been said that Denkavit views Art. 3.2 
as containing a lex specialis that is also subject to a 
strict and literal interpretation.66 The fact is, 
however, that the Court does much more than that, 
This is why thc F CJ has defended a very broad concept of avoidance and fiscal evasión in the framcwork of the Directive 77/799, ¡n clear contrast with the concept 
maintained oucside this norm; see for instance the case Whl, C-420/98, 13 April 2000; see a comment on this case at Calderón Carrero, n  59 above, pp  318-319  
'  the risk of tax avoidance cannot be relied upon in this context  Article 52 of the EF C Treaty does not permit any derogación from the fundamental principie of 
freedom of establishment on such a ground' {Commission/France, C-270/83, para  25)  
In X and Y ¡I (C-436/00, para  51)  In that case, the Court rejected a Swedish anti-avoidance rule which ainied at controlling the transfers of assets and the like to 
corporations located in other Member States at very low pric es  In the Court's opinión, the provisión was inappropriate - i e  not proportionate to its objeccive -
and it thercforc caused a discriminación against those transactions concluded outside the country, in terms that it considers to be contrary to the freedom of 
establishment  
That was spccially evident in the IC¡ case, where the Court developed a 'creative' or rather extensive interpretación of the freedom of establishment by interpreting 
¡t in the light of thc ultímate objective of the treaty: thc realisation of an interior market; see in this regard: Caamaño Anido and Calderón Carrero, n  5 above, pp  
21 and 24, regarding the ICI case (264/96)  
Which states: 'By way of derogation from paragraph I, Member States shall have the opción of  not applying this Directive to companies of that Member State 
which do not maintain for an uninterrupted period of at least two years holdings qualifying them as parent companies or to those of their companies in which a 
company of another Member State does not maintain such a holding for an uninterrupted period of at least two years'  
Francois Hoenjet: 'The Leur-Bloem judgmenc: the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and the interpretación of the anti-abuse clause in the Merger 
Directive', EC Tax Keview 1997, no  4, p  212  
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and goes well beyond the literal meaning of the 
words, as it limits the scope of Art. 1.2 to that of 
Art. 3.2. The consequence is a practical 'mutation' 
of the concept, and a clear restriction of the 
reference that Art. 1.2 operates to national GAARs. 
To some, thís ímplies that no national anti-
avoidance provisión can be applied to this range 
of cases.67 More likely, however, as J. Calderón 
puts it, the Decisión does point to a priority 
application of the specific anti-avoidance clauses 
established in the Directive over the domestic ones. 
The latter must depart from and take into account 
the material requirements set in the Directive, such 
as the hokling period clause.é8 
The Court has also substantially reduced the 
scope of the anti-avoidance clause contained in the 
Merger Directive, basically by defining in very 
strict terms the concept of valid commercial 
reasons. For the sake of clarity and completeness, 
I deal with this later on, in a special section, by way 
of comparing it with the 'traditionaP busíness 
purpose doctrine. In short, it is clear that the Court 
is most restrictive when interpreting anti-avoidance 
clauses contained in the Directives or at least 
originated by them. 
Whether the measure intends to establish some 
kind of tax control to monitor the flow of 
revenues. Clearly, the Court bestows a different 
treatment dependíng of whether the measure is 
anti-avoidance, or has as its tnain intention to 
establish control measures, such as was pointed out 
in Futura Parücipations (C-250/97).69 
Whether, or to what extent, the measure can be 
regarded as a restriction. As I have pointed out 
earlier on, the Court not only does not rnake the 
distinction between restrictions and non-discrimi-
nation very clear, but has been widely (and 
confusingly) applying the first to direct taxes. 
The main problem is that the restriction concept 
can only be applied in an 'all or nothing' manner, 
as it does not require, ñor permit reaily, the 
comparison in terms of similarity in different 
situations. When applied to income taxes, not only 
this criterion is not clearly understood, but gives 
rise to a number of questions that turn around a 
basic, quasi-philosophical one: what exactly are 
taxes? Viewed from a strict non-restriction con-
cept, any tax is a burden that will hinder the free 
movement across borders. Of course that would 
mean going too far, but the direction adopted by 
the Court seems to flirt with that idea.70 
To confuse matters further, all these criteria or 
elements are intertwined in the reasoning of the ECJ 
so that there is not always a clear or straight path to 
follow. In the end, the only key criterion is the 
proportionality of a given measure to its purported 
objective, which of course is also extremely flexible.71 
Bearing the above considerations in mind, I will 
now merely point out some of the basic conclusions 
that may be drawn from the existing decisions, in order 
to assess fully the European concept of tax avoidance. 
In principie, 'exit taxes' are forbidden within the 
EU. The Court has clearly established that transactions 
or arrangements that clearly constitute an exercise of 
the fundamental freedoms cannot be considered 
avoidance for that matter; that is, exit taxes are 
forbidden by EU law when they are merely based on 
the fact of the exit company or person moving to 
another Member State. So, 'the transfer of a physical 
person's tax residence outside the territory of a 
Member State does not, in itself, imply tax avoidance'. 
The Court categorically states that: 'tax evasión or tax 
fraud cannot be inferred generally from the fact that 
the transfcree company or its parent company is 
established in another Member State and cannot justify 
a fiscal measure which compromises the exercise of a 
fundamental freedom. guaranteed by the Treaty' (X 
and Y //, para. 62, Lasteyrie, para. 5172). 
The reason these taxes are basically forbidden, is 
that they are considered restrictive. This poses the 
problem of the very broad terms employed by the 
Court when defining what can constitute a restriction; 
the Court refers to it claiming the 'dissuasive effect' of 
a provisión (Lasteyrie, para. 45). Or the fact that it 
mav hinder or rnake less attract'we the exercise of 
Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk: 'The EC corporace tax direct i ves - anti-abuse provisions, direct effect, Germán implementation law', Intertax 1992, nos  8-9, p  489; 
although chis last author introduces a nuance, in the sense that ic merely modifies the interpretación of che anti-avoidance provisión  
Calderón Carrero: 'A Post-Denkavit Review of the Anti-Directive Shopping Rules in Spain: eommencs on a case involving US and Dutch Parent companies', Tax 
Notes International (fortheoming), p, 12  A similar interpretación had been defended by: Wolfgang Schon: Die Auslegung europaischen Steuerrecbt. Das 
harmonisierte Steuerrecbt zwischen nationalem Zivilrecht und europaischem Gemeinscbaftsrecht, Verlag Dr  Ot to Schmidt (Koln, 1993), p  70 and Dennis Weber: 
'A closer look at the general anti-abuse clause in the Parent-Subsidiary Dircctive and the Merger Directive', EC Tax Review 1996, no  2, p  64, whose views may 
have had an influence on the Court  See also: Weber: 'The first steps of the ECJ concerning an abuse-doctrine in the field of harmoni/ed direct taxes', EC Tax 
Review 1997, no  1, p  30  
In the context of fiscal control measures, the proportionality of a given provisión is measured in the light of che Directive 77/799; Caamaño Anido and Calderón 
Carrero, see n  5 above, p  30  See, regarding the Futura case, vvhere a tax control measure was at stake: Caamaño Anido, Calderón Carrero and Martín Jiménez, 
see n  51 above  
Vanistendael, scc n  55 above, p  140  
ínter alia in: X and Y l! (C-436/00, para  49); Lankhorst-Hohorst (C-324/00, para  33), or Futura Participations (C-250/97, para  26); see in chis regard: Calderón 
Carrero and Martín Jiménez, see n  52 above, pp  80 and 81  
In Lasteyrie du Saillant, the ECJ declared void a French exir tax on the grounds that it infringed tipon the freedom of establishment  The main argument was that it 
constituted a burden to the exercise of the said freedom  which could however not be justified with reference to the purpose of countering tax avoidance hecausc the 
measure itself did not only target contrived or artificial arrangements, but any sicuation where the taxpayer decides to abandon the country and move to another 
Member State  What the Court attacks in Lasteyrie, is the  assumption that leaving the country may give place to avoidance, thus granting the same treatment to 
situations regardless of vvhecher or not they actually incur in such avoidance  
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fundamental freedoms (Centros, C-212/97, para. 34 
(author's emphasis)). 
Tax avoidance provisions must be proportionate to 
their objective. To the Court, this means that measures 
that may affect the exercise of fundamental freedoms 
'must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by 
imperative requirements in the general interest; they 
must be suitable for securing the attainment of the 
objective which they pursue; and they must not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to attain it' 
(Centros, C-212/97, para. 34). Specifically, Member 
States may not presume avoidance unless they intend 
to prevent wholly artificial arrangements to circum-
vent national tax legislation. This, for instance, cannot 
be just presumed: in the establishment of a subsidiary 
abroad (ICI, C-264/96); any situation in which a parent 
company has its seat abroad (Lankborst, C-324/00); 
the establishment of a parent company or of a 
subsidiary abroad (X and YII, C-436/00) or a situation 
when an individual merely transfers his/her residence 
to another Member State (Lasteyrie, C-9/02). 
The Court has also pointed out that merely trying 
to guarantee revenues is not enough of a justification, 
for 'a reduction of revenue . . . is not one of the grounds 
lísted in Article 46 EC and cannot be regarded as a 
matter of overriding general interest which may be 
relied upon in order to justify unequal treatment that is 
in principie incompatible with Article 52 of the Treaty' 
(ICI, para. 28; Saint-Gobain, para. 50). The Court 
makes it clear that protecting revenues is not a 
criterion enough as to safeguard a given provisión. 
Of course what is not so evident is when can we 
conclude that a would-be anti-avoidance provisión has 
that as one of its purposes. We must bear in mind that, 
at least as a matter of principie, anti-avoidance rules 
do not have as their primary objective the protection of 
revenues. This of course will come as a natural 
consequence, but such an objective would not justify 
their existence in the light of most EU Member States' 
constitutions. It is the protection of the principie of 
equality, of the adequate distribution of public burdens 
among citizens that constitutionally justifies the 
introduction of anti-avoidance measures. To the extent 
that every tax has as one of its main purposes the 
obtaining of revenues, and is therefore legitímate 
because of it, it logically follows that any measure 
that intends to protect the tax system will have a 
similar objective. In short, it is not clear exactly what 
the Court is referring to. This can only be explained as 
a response given to the parties that brought up the 
argument in the first place. 
Every anti-avoidance provisión must be interpreted 
in accordance to the EC law vvhere they must be 
applied. The Court then establishes a purposive 
interpretation that merely, or mainly, takes into 
account the EU law. Therefore, although: 
'it is true that according to the case law of the Court 
a Member State is entitled to take measures 
designed to prevent certain of its nationals from 
attempting, under cover of the rights created by the 
Treaty, improperly to circumvent their national 
legislation or to prevent individuáis from impro-
perly or fraudulently taking advantage of provisions 
of Community law.. .However, although, in such 
circumstances, the national courts may, case by 
. case, take account — on the basis of objective 
evidence - of abuse or fraudulent conduct on the 
part of the persons concerned in order, where 
appropriate, to deny them the benefit of the 
provisions of Community law on which they seek 
to rely, they must nevertbeless assess such conduct 
in the light of the objectives pursued by tbose 
provisions' (Centros, C-212/97, paras. 24 and 25 
(author's emphasis)). 
The avoidance transaction must be clearly so. In the 
Court's opinión, only those provisions aimed at 
dismounting artificial or contrived transactions, under-
taken for the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit, may be 
targeted by anti-avoidance rules; i.e. 'designed to exelude 
from a tax advantage purely artificial schemes designed 
to circumvent [any Member States'] tax law' (X and Y 
II, para. 61; Lasteyrie, para. 50). Artificial is then defined 
in terms that may be very similar to the concept of sham. 
Furthermore, there must be a clear-cut cause-effect 
relationship between the arrangement transaction and 
the tax benefit. Every anti-avoidance measure must 
establish a precise link between the purported tax-
payer's objective of obtaining a certain benefit and an 
artificial arrangement: 
Tn that regard, the national courts may, case by 
case, take account — on the basis of objective 
evidence — of abuse or fraudulent conduct on the 
part of the persons concerned in order, where 
appropriate, to deny them the benefit of the 
provisions of Community law on which they seek 
to rely, but they must nevertheless assess such 
conduct in the light of the objectives pursued by 
those provisions' (X and Y //, para. 42). 
Henee, the Court rules against specific anti-avoidance 
provisions that take into account a lump-sum group of 
cases, without verifying whether or not there is 
avoidance. A general assumption, even if it is iuris 
tantum, that certain transactions, carried out under 
circumstances that show that the whole arrangement 
was entered into in order to save taxes (low price, 
foreign Corporation...) are avoidance transactions is 
rejected up-front by the Court as long as the parts in 
the transaction are carrying out the exercise of the said 
fundamental freedom. 
The analysis and definition of the economic motives 
must depart from the fundamental freedoms; there is a 
sort of 'fundamental freedoms-business purpose test'. 
The Court has carried out a very strict interpretation 
of any kind of anti-avoidance measures. In order to 
fully assess the implications of this case law I will 
compare the two cases that epitomise, respectively, the 
business purpose test doctrine - Helvering v Gregory — 
and the anti-avoidance opinión of the Court regarcling 
tax free corporate reorganisations — Leur-Bloem — 
which constitutes an authorised interpretation of the 
economic motives criterion enshrined in Art. 11 of the 
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Merger Directive. Mutatis mutandi, both Mrs. Helver-
ing and Mrs. Gregory carried out a tax-free reorgani-
zation ¡n order to advantage of the special tax benefits 
established in the pertinent provisions. 
7. An example: the business purpose test 'at work': a 
comparíson of Helveríng v Gregory and Leur-Bloem 
The most representative case regarding the business 
purpose test doctrine is usually cited as Helvering v 
Gregory/3 The business purpose test doctrine has had 
a vvide influence outside the US; for example, it served 
as a basis for the inflection point that lead to a new 
approach, the 'new realism', epitomised by the Ramsay 
case (W T Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commissioner s1'"1) 
that purported a purposive interpretation of tax 
statutes which has proved very effective in countering 
tax avoidance despite no GAAR.75 
To a ccrtain extent, che facts resemble Leur-
Bloem's. Ms. Gregory carried out a corporate reorga-
nisation without any other business purpose than to 
save taxes/6 The arrangement, she claimed, was not 
really artificial, in the sense that. it had been effectively 
carried out following the strict terms of the law 
establishing the tax exemption, that defined a reorga-
nisation as 'a transfer by a Corporation of all or a part 
of its assets to another Corporation if immediately after 
the transfer the transferor or its stockholders or both 
are in control of the Corporation to which the assets 
are transferred'. That is, no minimal holding period or 
any other requisite is established in the law. The Court 
disregarded the operation, following this track of 
thought. 
(1) The arrangements are recharacterized not only 
beca use they lack an autonomous commercial or 
business purpose, as could be concluded at first 
sight, but because they are artificial, inadequate to 
the economic end, except for the result consisting 
of a tax benefit. In the words of the Court, 
artificiality and lack of valid economic reasons are 
two sides of the same coin. Therefore, although the 
corporation was indeed created, following the text 
of the norm, 'that corporation was nothing more 
than a contrivance to the end last described [to 
obtain a tax benefit]. It was brought into existence 
for no other purpose; it performed, as it was 
intended from the beginning it should perform, no 
other function'. And this is why the operation is 
disregarded: 
'In these circumstances, the facts speak for 
themselves and are susceptible of but one 
interpretation. The whole undertaking, though 
conducted according to the terms of [the 
pertinent provisión] was in fact an elabórate 
and devious form of conveyance masquerading 
as a corporate reorganización, and nothing else. 
The rule which exeludes from consideration the 
motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the 
situation, because the transaction upon its face 
lies outside the plain intent of the statute. To 
hold otherwise would be to exalt artífice above 
reality and to deprive the statutory provisión in 
question of all serious purpose'' (author's 
emphasis). 
(2) The business purpose doctrine adopts an objective 
perspective, without íurther analysing the actual 
will or motive of the taxpayer with regard to 
saving taxes. The US Supreme Court admits that 
the subjective intención of the taxpayer will not be 
taken into account if the arrangement has actually 
been undertaken; 'It is quite true that if a 
reorganisation in reality was effected within the 
meaning of [the pertinent provisión] the ulterior 
purpose mentioned will be disregarded'. 
(3) The business purpose test is nothing more, ñor less, 
This case had been previously decided ac che Seeond Circuit Court of Appeals, where Judge Learned Hand had disregarded che operación [293 US 465, 468], which 
was rejected by the Board of Tax Appeals, which uphcld the petitioner's view [27 BTA 223]  Finally, the case made ic co the US Supreme Court, that assumed all che 
arguments employed ac che Court of Appeals [(1935) 293 US 465]; the business purpose test doctrine can also be found, ínter alia, ac: Helvering u Clifford, 309 US 
331 (1940), 1940-1 CB 105; Zmuda v Commissioner, 731 F 2d 1417 (9th Cir  1984); Segal v Commissioner, 41 F 3d 1144, 1148 (7ch Cir  1994); Yosha u 
Commissioner, 861 F 2d 494 (7ch Cir  1988); ACM Partnersbip v Commissioner, 157 F 3d 231, 246-47 (3d Cir 1998)  
Henee departing from the excessive literalism that had been dominant in the case law, and that was clearly reflected in Duke of Westtninster, quoted above  The 
influence of the business purpose test doctrine is also very clear in Furniss v Dawson (1984) 55 TC 324  The nmin elements in Furniss are similar to Helvering's. See 
a full account of the influence of the business purpose test in che UK at: Millett, see n  38 above, p  332; see also Nevermann, n  16 above, p  180; Maicolm Gammie: 
'Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law: a perspective from the United Kingdom', i» Graeme Cooper {ed.j, Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (International Burean 
of Fiscal Documentation, Amsterdam, 1997), p  189; Jefferson Vanderwolk, 'Purposive Interpretation of Tax Statutes: Recent UK Decisions on Tax Avoidance 
Transaction', International fíitreau of Fiscal Documentation 2002, p  71, 
Another example of business purpose test, as applied too to a company rescructure, can be found in che Auscralian case FCT v Peabody [94 ATC 4663]; see a 
chorough commencary on that case at: Passanc, n  17 above, p  455  
Vanderwolk, see n  74 above, pp  75 and 76  A different view is that adopted by che 1FS, see n  4 above, pp  14 and 15, that maintains che limitación of case law when 
fighting cax avoidance  
As described in che case brought before che US Supreme Court, the facts are che following: Ms  Gregory was che owner of all che stock of United Mortgage 
Corporation, which held among irs assecs 1,000 shares of che Monitor Secundes Corporation  For the solé purpose of procuring a transfer of these shares to herself 
in order co scll them fot her individual profit, and, at  the same tirne, diminish the amount of income tax which would result from a direct transfer by way of 
dividend, she soughc to bring abouc a cax free 'reorganisation' under s  112(g) of the Revenue Act of 1928  To that end, she caused the Avcrill Corporation to be 
organised under the laws of Delaware on 18 September 1928  Three days later, the United Mortgage Corporation cransferred to the Avcrill Corporation the 1,000 
shares of Monitor stock, for which all the shares of the Avcrill Corporation were issued to the petitioner  On 24 September the Averill Corporation was dissolved, 
and liquidated by discribucing all its assets, namely, the Monicor shares, co the petitioner  No other business was ever transacted, or intended to be transacted, by 
that company  Petitioner immediately sold che Monicor shares for USD 133,333  33  She returned for taxation, as capital net gain, che sum of USD76,007 88, based 
upon an apportioned cost of USD57,325 45  It is not disputed chat if the interposition of the so-called reorganisation was ineffective, pecicioner beca me Hable for a 
much largor cax as a result of the transaction  
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than a type of teleological interpretación applied to 
tax norms, which pays attention to the underlying 
economic basis of the pertinent act or arrangemenr. 
'The question for determination is whether what 
was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing 
which the statute intended.'7-' Ms. Leur-Bloem's 
purpose was to carry out a reorganisation that 
would qualify as 'merger by exchange of shares', in 
order to have the possibility of setting off any 
losses within the tax entity thus created. The tax 
authority denied this treatment on the grounds that 
the purpose would not be to establish a permanent 
single entity; as such an entity already existed, 
taking into account that the would-be merged 
companies had the same director and solé share-
hokler. There was no business purpose in the 
operación, according to the tax auchorities. Leaving 
aside che very arguable conclusión that the ECJ 
may rule on a case that is strictly domestic/8 the 
relevance of the case lays in the requisites for a 
reorganisation co benefit from the special tax 
regime. 
In principie, the Court seems to admic che 'tax 
purpose', just as in Helvering the 'right' to 
minimise taxes was also accepced. Buc this is done 
in order to determine the scope of the Directive 
rules: 
Tt must be observed first of all that it is clear 
from Article 2(d) and from the general scheme 
of the Directive that the common tax rules 
which it lays down, which cover different tax 
advantages, apply without distinction to all 
mergers, divísions, transfer of assets or ex-
changes of shares irrespective of the reasons, 
whether financial, economic or simply fiscal, for 
those operations [para. 35] ... Consequently, 
the fact that the acquiring company, within the 
meaning of Article 2(h) of the Directive, does 
not itself carry on a business or that the same 
natural person, who was the solé shareholder 
and director of the companies acquired, be-
comes the solé shareholder and director of che 
acquiring company does noc prevent the opera-
cion from being treated as an exchange of shares 
within che meaning of Article 2(d) of the 
Directive' (para. 36). 
The Court then admits the tax motivation as a 
valid economic reason. 
Of course that admission is later subject to a 
number of nuances; Member States may, as 
authorised by the Directive, restrict the appíication 
of its tax benefits in the absence of valid economic 
motives, and they may thus stipulate 'thac che face 
chac chose operations were noc carried out for valid 
commercial reasons constitutes a presumption of 
tax evasión or tax avoidance' (para. 40). However, 
and here is where restrictions begin: 'in order to 
determine whether the planned operación has such 
an objective, che competent national authorities 
cannot confine themselves co applying predeter-
mined general criteria but must subject each 
particular case to a general examination' (para. 
41). The Court considers that 'the laying down of a 
general rule automatically excluding certain cate-
gories of operations from the tax advantage [...] 
would go further than is necessary for preventing 
such tax evasión or tax avoidance and would 
undermine the aim pursued by the Directive' (para. 
44). The Court also makes it clear that the 
restricción does not only apply to the words of 
the provisión itself, but extends also to its 
interpretación by the domestic coures and tax 
authorities: 'this would also be the case if a rule 
of this kind were to be made subject to the mere 
possibility of the grane of a derogación, ac che 
discretion of the adminisrrative authority' (para. 
44). 
(4) As for the concept of valid commercial reasons, the 
Court is also extremely careful when analysing the 
actual factors that had been put forward in order 
to deny the tax benefits. The result is a consider-
able widening of the scope of such reasons: 
'A merger or a restructuring carried out in the 
form of an exchange of shares involving a 
newiy-created holding company which does noc 
cherefore have any business may be regarded as 
having been carried out for valid commercial 
reasons. Similarly, such reasons may render 
necessary the legal restructuring of companies 
which already form an entity from the economic 
and financial point of view. Even if this may 
constitute evidence of tax evasión or tax 
avoidance, it is nevertheíess possible that a 
merger by exchange of shares with the aim of 
creating a specific structure for a limited period 
of time and not on a permanent basis may have 
valid commercial reasons' (para. 42, author's 
emphasis). 
The Court seems to feel compelled to give an 
explanation of such a restrictive view: 
'According to the first recital of its preamble, 
the aim of the Directive is to introduce tax rules 
which ate neutral from the point of view of 
competition in order to allow enterprises to 
adapt themselves to the requirements of the 
common market, to increase cheir productivity 
and to improve cheir competitive strength ac che 
internacional level. That same recital also stares 
thac mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and 
Gtlbert v Commissioner, 248 F 2d 399, 411 (2d Cir  1957)  A recorded and cióse origin of the business purpose test can actually be found in the 'subst.ince over 
form' doctrine, not exclusive of tax law; see further details at Nevermann, n  16 above, p  240  
Seo  in this regard: Caamaño Anido, Calderón Carrero and Martín Jiménez, n  51 above, p  415  
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exchanges of shares concerning campantes of 
different Metnber States ought not to be 
hampered by restrictions, disaduantages or 
distortions arising in particular from the tax 
provisions of the Member States* (para. 45, 
author's emphasis). 
In the end, what the Court says may not be so 
consistent with what the Court does: although its 
opinión seems to be to leave the door open for the 
establishment of anti-avoidance provisions, it 
nevertheless denies one that was feasibly a tax 
driven purpose (horizontal off-setting of losses). In 
my opinión, the fact that the Dutch tax law offered 
the possibility of benefiting from a tax-free 
reorganisation that will also allow for the hor-
izontal off-setting of losses should not have been 
considered enough to act as a safe harbour rule 
that may exelude avoidance.79 
In principie, the Court's interpretation is in line with 
its literal approach to anti-avoidance measures. 
Notwithstanding, in this case it may be arguable 
whether the interpretation of the Directive is actually 
consistent with its literal meaning at all, as in the 
Court's view, the mere existence of an economic 
reason seems to be enough, and it is not clear that this 
interpretation is even consistent with its objective, in 
that it does not seem to consider the purpose of the tax 
provisions establish in the Directive.80 That is probably 
the main difference with Heli/ering, where the courts 
departed from the tax provisions themselves. 
Of course the first problem that appears vvhen 
analysing a given transaction or arrangement from the 
perspective of its business purpose is that it is very 
usual that a taxpayer enters a transaction having, as 
one of his objectives or even as one of the most 
important objectives, to minimise taxes. This is, 
however, not the object of anti-avoidance provisions 
or anti-avoidance judicial constructions. What should 
trigger them, in order to disregard the operation for the 
purpose of the tax benefit, is both that and the fact that 
the way taxes were minimised or avoided 'confliets 
with or defeats the evident intention of the Parlia-
ment'.81 That conflict will not ensue if the transaction 
can be regarded as protected, what will happen not 
only when it does not conflict with the said intention, 
but also when it has been encouraged by legislation. 
The problem is that the ECJ seems to attend only to 
this last element, what necessarily derives either from 
an excessive literalism in interpreting the tax benefits 
established in the Directives, or from a purpose 
oriented interpretation of such norms which departs 
only from the fundamental freedoms, thus disregarding 
the 'purpose' of the tax provisions themselves that 
seem to be regarded more as burdens than as norms 
per se. 
In my view, the problem lies in the fact that the ECJ 
treats anti-avoidance measures as something located 
outside the provisión establishing the tax benefit - the 
Merger Directive in that case — instead of considering it 
a part of the correct interpretation of the norm itself, 
as we have argued earlier in this work. In Leur-Bloern 
the Court carnes out a very strict interpretation of s. 11 
of the Directive, from which it follows that Member 
States cannot impose requirements that intend to 
counter or curb abuse that are not perfectly aligned 
with the said provisión.82 
In the end, it is quite clear that when the national 
anti-avoidance provisión is a development of one that 
had been previously authorised or established in a 
Directive, the Court directly establishes the concept of 
tax avoidance, and when the anti-avoidance provisión 
has been established by the Member State in the first 
place, to the extent that it may be applied to EU-
transactions, the ECJ subjeets them to a number of 
requirements that are not all that clear but that can be 
summarised in the requirement that any anti-avoidance 
measure must be proportionate to its objective and 
should have a minimal incidence in the transactions 
whatsoever, so that it may be declared void when it is 
feasible to imagine other, less restrictive, measures to 
the same end (Lasteyrie, 1CI, inter alia)P 
B. Soma remarks on the ECJ's concept of tax 
avoidance and its consequences for GAARs in 
Europe 
1. The problem with the purported EU concept oí tax 
avoidance 
The Court has established a concept of tax avoidance, 
albeit roughly and in an indirect manner.84 The ECJ 
doctrine can only be understood bearing in mind that 
every element of tax avoidance legislation must be 
defined in accordance to the fundamental freedoms 
which, more often than not, entail that an arrangement 
carried out in the exercise of such freedoms sha 11 not 
be considered avoidance. Therefore, any-arrangement 
that purports to benefit from a better tax regime is in 
principie adequate when it has been entered into in the 
As Weber, n  68 above, p  65, among ochéis, suggests  
García Prats, see n  7 above, p  201  
iFS, see n  4 above, p  59-
Hoenjet, see n  66 above, p  212  
Calderón Carrero and Martín Jiménez, see n  52 above, pp  82 and 83; Calderón Carrero, see n  68 above  
Wolfgang Schón: 'Gestaltungsmibbrauch im curopáischen Sceuerrechc', Internationales Steuerrecht 19 96, pp  11 and 12; Radler; Lausterer and Blumenberg: 'Tax 
abuse and EC law  Does the general application of the Germán Anti-Abuse Rule under sección 42 of the Germán General Tax Act to Germán parcicipations in Irish 
1FSC subsidiarles infringe Community law ?', EC Tax Review 1997, no  2, p  97; García Prats, see n  7 above, p  169  
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exercise of a fundamental freedom. The freedoms 
often constitute a sort of 'saving clause' with regard to 
tax avoidance. 
The limitation of anti-avoidance measures by the 
ECJ may be in many cases justified by the need to 
assure an adequate functioning of the fundamental 
freedoms. But this must be coherent with the limita-
tion, and the rationalisation, of special low taxatíon 
regimes, as authorised by the Commission. The free 
competition model cannot function in the EU if the 
other derivation of the non-discrimination principie, 
the Aid of State regime, does not also opérate 
correctly. As inconsistent with the UE principies are 
the forms and arrangements that may abuse certain tax 
benefits, as may be the benefits themselves. Both must 
comply with the general EU principies. U. Paschen goes 
further and states that it should then necessarily follow 
that an arrangement that has been entered hito in order 
to benefit from a lower tax regime which does not 
comply with the fundamental freedoms, would qualify 
as tax avoidance.85 The idea is to purport a reasonable 
understanding of the possibility of tax competition, 
which is not by itself a right but only the natural 
consequence of the normal functioning of the EU 
fundamental freedoms, just as the 'right' to save taxes 
is merely the natural consequence of the possibility of 
choosing different legal forms or ways to carry out a 
business, as explained above. However, anti-avoidance 
rules and the regime of the Aid of State are so different 
in their basis as in their requisites and consequences 
that the said reasoning can hardly be shared. 
In the present moment, the interpretation of the 
Court may give place to a number of dissonances with 
the common knowledge of tax avoidance. In the 
Court's view, only those arrangements that can be 
considered artificial may be disregarded for tax 
purposes. Furthermore, artificiality is defined in such 
strict terms that, in the limit, it presents certain 
similaríties with the sham. Because the question was 
not vvhether Ms. Leur-Bloem had actually carried out a 
reorganisation or not; for she obviously had, at least 
taken from the perspective of the commercial laws 
regulating them. Viewed from that perspective, it was 
not an artificial arrangement. The question was rather 
whether she had a right to a tax-free reorganisation. In 
order to assess this last element one cannot ignore the 
tax norms. The interpretation must take into account 
the relevant tax provisions, not just the commercial 
laws and, for that matter, the fundamental freedoms. It 
cannot be carried out outside the boundaries of the tax 
norms, for then not just the door for tax planning, but 
to sheer tax avoidance will be ajar. 
In the end, what purposive interpretation of tax 
provisions actually means is that tax law must detach 
itself from prívate law. The opposite view invariably 
leads to a breeding grouncl for tax avoidance. As I ha ve 
pointed out earlier on in this article, the stricter, and 
the less autonomous, the interpretation of tax norms, 
the easier it will be to bring about successful tax 
avoidance schemes. 
The problem then, is that the ECJ is interpreting tax 
law, and of course anti-avoidance provisions, from the 
perspective of the fundamental freedoms, which may-
or may not coincide with the 'traditional' tax 
principies. Thus, while the principie of non-discrimi-
nation which lies at the origin of the four fundamental 
freedoms, has a great área of coincidence with the 
equality principie in taxation, that is not the case for 
other principies, that necessarily require uneven 
treatments, such as the ability to pay principie. In that 
regard, the ECJ theory on tax avoidance may genérate 
inequalities, in the sense of preventing a correct 
assignment of the tax burdens.86 In this regard, it is 
pertinent to point out that fiscal control measures may 
also serve the purpose of assuring an adequate 
distribution of the tax burden. 
Furthermore, at the same time that the ECJ limits 
the concept of tax avoidance, it may be incentivizing 
the use of GAARs instead of specific anti-avoidance 
measures by Member States. To a certain extent, the 
attack to the specific anti-avoidance measures should 
be welcomed, at least in that they are deemed to 
genérate a number of perverse side effects.87 
But the ECJ case law also has a clear incidence in 
the GAARs, as it forces their re-interpretation when 
applied to the EU context. In order to counter 
avoidance, Member States may develop doctrines 
preventing the abuse of fundamental freedoms, which 
shall of course be subject to further examination by the 
Court, or they may apply their national legislation 
against tax avoidance (i.e. Art. 15 of the LGT, s. 42.1 
of the AO, etc.), bearing in mind that it should at the 
same time comply with the requisites of the general 
interest exemptions.88 
A good example of how GAARs can be applied to 
EU situations without a problem is the reasoning of the 
BFH in the in the Duhlin Docks cases.89 The facts show 
a typical case of income outsourcing undertaken by a 
Germán society towards another capital holding 
Corporation (Kapitalanlagegeseílschaft) domiciled in 
Pasclien, see n  6 above, p  220  
García Prats, see n  7 above, p  176  
Such as creating 'road maps ' for would-be cax avoiders, increasing che complexity of cax systems and others pointed out by che Cárter Commission, 1966, pp  554-
556; Nevermann, see n  16 above, p  82; 1FS, see n  4 above, pp  4 and 5; Gammie, see n  74 above, p  194  
Calderón Carrero and Martín Jiménez, see n  50 above, p  64  
Germán investment in the Dublin Docks área has given place to a large number of BFH decisión»  The two 'correct' decisions, that establish the main guidelines to 
interpret the s  42 of the AO, with regard to the Ausbensteuergesetzt and the EU law are the decisions of 19 January 2000, (BStBl 11 2001, 222) and of 25 February 
2004 ¡1 R 42/02)  Only the latter exprcssly refers to EU law and the fact that che Irish arca had an express authorisation by the Commission to implement the 
especially low tax cegime (see particularly para  24)  Both decisions can be viewed at www bundesfinanzhof de  
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Dublin and located in the Dublin-Docks, that is the 
International Finance and Service Centre (IFSC), at the 
border Custom House Docks Área that benefits of a 
very advantageous tax regime, which includes among its 
advantages a 10 per cent tax rate in Corporation income 
tax, as approved by the EU. Clearly, the Germán GAAR 
(s. 42 of the AO) could only be appiicable taking into 
account the existing Irish state aid that had been 
previously authorised by the Commission, which 
conformed a sort of protected transaction.90 This is 
vvhat the BFH has stated after much controversy and 
decisions holding different views.91 
As for the Spanish GAAR, in principie Art.15 of the 
LGT seems to comply with the ECJ.92 At least in theory, 
for we must also take into account the interpretation 
carried out by the Spanish tax authorities. And here is 
where problems may begin. Apart from the problems 
deriving from its relationship with international treaties, 
which will not be discussed here,93 the decisions are 
vague, erratic and not all that predictable.94 
In short, to the extent that this may bring about a 
narrowing in the scope of the Member States' GAARs, 
and bearing in mind that such provisions are meant to 
protect their tax systems, the ECJ case law falls on the 
core of the design of tax systems, especially taking into 
account that, at the present raoment, virtually every 
EU country has anti-avoidance legislation or case 
law.95 Of course it may be true that the absence of 
common anti-abuse rules may lead to a distortion of 
the Common Market.96 The final problem is who is to 
define the common rule, or for that matter, a common 
interpretation to what abuse or avoidance really is. 
2. The problem with neutral (sic) tax provisions 
Neutralíty has often been mentioned as the objective of 
tax measures in the EU. To U. Paschen, it would be the 
only criterion suitable to establish a uniform inter-
pretation of anti-avoidance measures in the domestic, 
European and international arenas.97 The problem 
with neutrality in taxation is that it is not alvvays clear 
whether it even exists. Every tax brings about all kinds 
of effects quite apart from the obtaining of revenues.98 
Of course in some cases the tax norms mean to bring 
about other effects, such as influencing the behaviour 
of the taxpayer. In that case there is an intended 
neutrality.99 However, more often than not, what some 
refer to as neutrality is actually the construction and 
interpretation of tax measures following the acts or 
arrangements as defined in prívate law. 
This is why neutrality cannot easily be employed as 
a criterion without being misleading, at least when 
referred to tax statutes. The criterion must consist of 
whether or not the arrangement compites with the 
norm, which necessarily takes us back to the problem 
of purposive interpretation. According to the ECJ 
interpretation, the Merger Directive may function as a 
sort of 'safe harbour', in the sense that transactions 
carried out under its scope are 'protected transactions' 
with regard to tax avoidance provisions. The reasoning 
seems to imply that, precisely because the Directive 
contains a clear incentive to merge, in order to 
facilítate commerce, it is not possible to deny the tax 
benefit on the exclusive grounds that the taxpayer 
actually did merge for tax reasons.100 In this case, the 
(tax) norm may be implicitly asking the taxpayer to do 
something for tax reasons. If that is the case, it is 
obvious that one cannot deny the benefit to the 
taxpayer on the grounds that it was a tax driven 
transaction, for that is precisely one of the elements 
that has been taken into account by the norm.101 In the 
end, what explains many ECJ decisions is not 
primarily that the anti-abuse provisión or equivalent 
goes against the fundamental freedom — although that 
might be the consequence — but its inconsistency with 
the ends of the tax regime (benefits, exemptions) as 
established in the Directive. The anti-abuse provisión 
Rádler; Lausterer and Blumenberg, sce n  84 above, p  99  
These cases wcnt so far as to cause a tax reform  Because in the first of the cases the BFH liad decided not to apply the general anti-avoidance rule, on the grounds 
that the AStG prevailed, as it was considered as a special anti-avoidance provisión, the tax authorities put forward, and obtained, a change in the AO, by 
introducing para  2 in s  42, which states that the GAAR set in para  1 will be applicable except when its application is expressly ruled out by any other law  This 
provisión, which constitutes a weird exception to the classicai rule of lex specialis derogat lex generalis has been welcomed with an almost unanimous critic, on the 
grounds that it is logically absurd, as well as useless  The reform, triggered by the above cited BFH case, entered into forcé shortly after, on 23 December 2001  In 
the end, the reform was a desperate attempt to make s  42 1 of the AO applicable at any rate, especially ¡n the European context  There are many interesting aspeets 
to this case which would requirc a different study  Not surprisingly, plenty of ink has flowed regarding these cases, see ínter alia: Bauschatz, 2002, p  334; 
Hoffmann, 1996, p  6588; Ruiz Almendral and Seitz, no  7 above, p  33  
Of the same opinión is Vega Borrego, n  57 above, p  372, footnote 1112, with reference to the former spanish GAAR, which however shared the essential elements 
with the present one, as I maintain with Georg Seitz, n  7 above  
See in this regard Martín Jiménez, n  48 above  
See, inter alta, Ruiz Almendral and Seitz, n  7 above; Ruiz Almendral and Zornoza Pérez, n  39 above  
Paschen, see n  6 above, p  198; Ruiz Almendral and Seitz, n  7 above  
Albert J  Rádler: 'Do National Anti-Abuse Clauses Distort the Internal Market?', European Taxation 1994, n  9, p  313  
Paschen, sce n  6 above, p  208  
Fritz Neumark: Grundsaeze gerechter und okonomisch rationaler Steuerpolitik (J C B  Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tiibingen, 1970), p  261; Birle, see n  6 above, p  8  
Klaus Vogel: 'Die Absichtung vori Rechtsfolgen im Steuerrecht', Steuer und Wirtschaft 1997, no  2, pp  97and 98; Tipke, see n  6 above, p  122  
García Prats, see n  7 above, p  175  
See this idea at the following BFH decisión: 9 November 2000, BStBl II 2001, 101, 102  See also in this regard: Falcón and Telia, see n  4 above, p  8; IFS, see n  4 
above, pp  43 and 44; Georg Crezelius: 'Das Argumentationsmuster des sog  Gesamtplans', Finanz-Rundschau, 8 June 2003, no  11, pp  537 and 541  
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does not comply with the purpose of the EU norra, 
which is of course interpretad in line with the 
freedoms. This should not happen with a GAAR, as 
it leaves a broader leeway to be interpretad by the tax 
authorities, who should bear in mínd all the pertinent 
legislation, especially including, of course, the tax 
exemptions that may have been strived for. 
C. A new approach? The opinión of Advócate 
Genera! Mr. Miguel Polares Maduro on VAT 
avoidance 
The recent Opinión of Advócate General Miguel 
Poiares Maduro sheds new light on the problem of 
tax avoidance in the European arena. Although the 
general tone of the Advócate is that of continuity with 
the previous ECJ case law, the fact is that it represents 
a qualitative turn in its general definition of avoidance 
as I have explained in previous pages. Should the Court 
finally accept Mr. Poiares' proposal, it will bring about 
a much more reasonable approach to the problem of 
tax avoidance, at least in the author's view. It is then 
especially pertinent to dedícate extensive attention here 
to this Opinión, as it constitutes a turn in the tax 
avoidance doctrine that could be perfectly extrapolated 
to cases involving other taxes. 
The Opinión, delivered on 7 April 2005, regards the 
accumulated cases C-255/02 (Halifax v Cornmissioners 
of Customs); C-419/02 {BUFA Hospitals v Cornmis-
sioners of Customs and Excise) and C-223/03 (Uni-
versity of Huddersfield Higher Education Corporation 
v Cornmissioners of Customs and Excise). The three 
cases refer to transactions entered hito for the purpose 
of gaining a tax advantage in terms of a right to deduct 
input VAT.102 In a nutshell, the Court is asked, first, to 
determine whether transactions carried out with the 
solé purpose of enabling input tax to be recovered may 
constitute an 'economic activity' within the meaning of 
s. 4.2 of the Sixth Directive. Secondly, to determine 
whether the doctrine of 'abuse ofrights' can be applied 
in the field of valué added tax, in order to disallow the 
claims to deduct this tax.103 As can easily be inferred 
from the following lines, the Opinión is not cxclusively 
applicable to VAT. 
An activity can be considered an economic activity 
in the VAT sense even if it is carried out for the solé 
purpose of avoiding the tax. As we have seen in 
previous paragraphs, there are two ideal ways of 
dealing with avoidance cases, by interpreting and 
recharacterizing the act or arrangcment, leaving it in or 
out the scope of the norm, or by accepting it fLilly but 
disregarding the tax benefits that it intends to obtain. 
These two possibilities were present in these VAT 
cases. The Advócate General opts for the second; to 
admit that it was an economic activity, as it does not 
lose its nature even when its main purpose was to 
avoid or defer the payment of the tax (para. 46), and 
then allow, as we will see, for a disregarding of the 
consequences. 
'It is true — the Opinión goes - that the transactions 
at issue in the present cases appear to be mere 
instruments or indirect dealings for the ímplementa-
tion of complex tax avoidance schemes. Tax 
avoidance, however, remains, in any case, an 
activity that is not inherently linked to the various 
business activities objectively carried out for con-
sideration in each of the particular transactions at 
issue. The tax avoidance purpose is therefore an 
external circumstance that does not change the 
inherent and objective nature of each of those 
transactions' (para. 47). 
This is perfectly coherent with the general definition of 
tax avoidance dealt with in the first part of this study. 
Tax avoidance presupposes the existenee of valid 
commercial transactions. Actually, those transactions 
must bring about its economic effeets in order to 
obtain the desired effect in the form of a tax benefit. 
The arrangement or act is perfectly valid from the 
prívate law perspective. The opposite view, not only 
would make tax avoidance an impossibility, but as Mr. 
Poiares puts it, would be against the objective nature of 
the notion of 'economic activity', 'which constitutes a 
fundamental feature of the VAT system, imposed by 
the principie of legal certainty, and should not be lelt 
to depend on the intentions of the traders involved' 
(para. 51). In short, 'the services and goods were 
effectively transferred in return for consideration, 
albeit as part of an operation that had been carefully 
orchestrated in order to créate a right to recover input 
tax' (para. 50). 
Furthermore, this is also the only possibie inter-
pretation consistent with the scope and application or 
EU law, as 'the need to prevent tax evasión or 
avoidance cannot therefore justify the adoption of 
national measures derogating from the directive 
otherwise than under the procedure provided for in 
Art. 27 {Commission/Frunce, para. 22) or rather, 'only 
derogations that are proportionate and necessary to 
achieve the aims expressly mentioned in Article 27 [of 
1 will not go into all detaiis of the cases, which are very well explained in the Opinión  Suffice it to say here that all of the three cases refer to schemes built in order 
to fully recover the whole of the input VAT on certain services and goods that, but for the schemes, would not have been possibie, as their main activities were 
exempt  
The question, as formulated in the Halifax, is the following: 
'(I) (a) In the relevant circumstances, do transactions: 
(i) effected by each participator with the intention solely of obtaining a tax advantage and 
(ii) which have no independent business purpose 
qualify for VAT purposes as supplies made by or to the participators in the course of their economic activities? 
(2) Docs the doctrine of abuse of rights as developed by the Court opérate to disallow the Appeliants their elaims for recovery of or relief for input tax arising 
from the implementation of the relevant transactions?"  
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the Directive] are authorised' (para. 77); 'the prohibi-
tion of abuse of Community law, seen as a principie of 
interpretation, does not give rise to derogations from 
the provisions of the Sixth Directive'; 'the operation of 
this principie of interpretation does not entail the result 
that the economic activities carried on ought to be 
disregarded for VAT purposes or left outside the scope 
of the Sixth Directive. An interpretation of the Sixth 
Directive according to this principie cannot but have 
the most obvious consequence to be expected in the 
context of legal interpretation: that the right is not in 
fact conferred, contrary to the literal meaning of the 
legal provisión. If this interpretation entails any kind of 
derogation, it will be only from the text of the rule, not 
from the rule itself, which comprises more than its 
literal element' (author's ernphasis, para. 78). 
In this case, the correct way to counter tax 
avoidance is not to limit the scope of the tax rules, 
but to carry out a correct interpretation of the tax 
statutes and nontis. The Advócate dedicates special 
attention to explain why the first approach, a 
limitación of the scope of the VAT rules for avoidance 
transactions, would not only be ineffective, but would 
also incur in a breach of the necessary legal certainty, 
as required by the rule of law. Furthermore, it would 
pose the problem of how to reconstruct the operations, 
should they be left outside the scope of the VAT. In the 
words of the Advócate General: 
'when one disregards tax avoidance transactions by 
leaving them outside the scope of the VAT system, it 
will be necessary to reconstruct the chain of supplies 
to redefine the identity of the recipients of those 
supplies that remain subject to VAT. Most Síkely the 
recipients of such supplies will not be those 
designated by the contracts or invoices relating to 
the disregarded transactions. This reconstruction 
poses serious problems . . . First, it assumes the 
existence of one normal way to carry on . . . but there 
is a risk that it might be a mere product of the 
imagination, because there is in principie no single 
normal way to conduct an economic activity . . . 
Secondly, it disregards germine transfers of property, 
or supplies of services made in return for economic 
consideration, to focus instead on the overall result 
of the operation' (paras. 54—56). 
This way of arguing acknowledges that the most 
effective solution to counter a scheme designed in 
order to obtain certain tax benefits, is to deny the 
benefits themselves, rather than leaving the whole 
scheme outside the system. This is exactly the 
approach followed by most GAARs and anti-avoid-
ance judicial doctrines, as I have explained above. 
The abuse of rights: the (long and winding) road to 
recognise fraus legis in taxation in its own right. The 
Advocate's answer to the question of whether or not 
the notion of 'abuse of rights', previously recognised 
by the Court in other áreas of Community law, may 
also be applícable in the field of VAT is specially 
interesting, as it becomes plain that the ECJ has indeed 
developed a doctrine which is perfectly in line with all 
anti-avoidance provisions and judicial doctrines. How-
ever, such a doctrine has not, as we have seen above, 
been normally applied to taxation issues or, specifi-
cally, to cases involving tax avoidance schemes. On the 
contrary, anti-avoidance measures seem to have been 
largely regarded more as burdens standing in the way 
to EU market integration than as measures protecting 
the tax systems themselves. 
As the Advócate summarises, the notion of abuse in 
the case law of the ECJ has made it clear that: 'the 
improper circumvention of a Member State's rules by 
the exploitation of [the fundamental] freedoms is not 
permissible',104 'benefits cannot be acquired by way of 
abuse or fraudulent conduct', that 'if it could be shown 
that the importation and re-exportation of the cheese 
were not realised as bona fide commercial transac-
tions, but only in order wrongfully to benefit from the 
grant of monetary compensatory amounts' the pay-
ment would not be due,105 and that, at any rate, 'a 
iMember State is entitled to take measures designed to 
prevent certain of its nationals from attempting, under 
the cover of the rights created by the Treaty, 
improperly to circumvent their national legislation or 
to prevent individuáis from improperly or fraudulently 
taking advantage of the provisions of Community 
law'.106 
Although the notion of abuse has been basically 
analysed regarding Community law provisions (that 
are abusively invoked in order to evade national law or 
that are abusively relied upon in order to gain 
advantages in a manner that conflicts with the 
purposes and aims of those same provisions (para. 
62)), the existing case law allows the extraction of a 
general principie of Community law, which cannot 
then 'be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends'. 
Regarding moving towards a clear recognition of 
GAARs, the Advócate goes on to extract the pertinent 
consequences of the aforementioned notion of tax 
abuse with regard to tax avoidance. Here, the first 
paragraph is very cautious. Mr. Poiares acknowledges 
the fact that the ECJ has not precisely been widely 
endorsing the tax avoidance doctrine, but he does that 
in very 'diplomatic' terms, by stating that 'the Court 
attempts to strike a cautious balance between leaving it 
to the national courts to assess the abuse in accordance 
with their own relevant national rules and ensuring 
that that assessment does not prejudice the full effect 
and uniform application of the Community law 
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provisions allegedly relied upon in an abusive manner'. 
Consequently, it continúes, 'the Court has developed 
the parameter according to which that assessment is to 
he made at national level. First, the assessment of the 
abuse must be based on objective evidence. Second, 
and most importantly, it must be made in conformity 
with the purpose and objectives of the provisión of 
Community law allegedly relied upon in an abusive 
way' (para. 64). 
Once this sort of warning (or maybe apology), has 
been made, the Opinión goes on to demónstrate, and 
acknowledge, for the salce of the accumulated cases, 
that the general anti-abuse case law is perfectly 
applicable to the contended VAT cases. The Opinión 
departs from Emsland Stdrke (C-110/99), a case 
regarding export rights,107 to establish that the 
following. 
* In order to determine the existence of an abuse, a 
purposive interpretation of the pertinent norms 
must be undertaken —'the assessment of the abuse 
is based on whether the right claimed is consonant 
with the purposes of the rules that formally give 
rise to it' (para. 67), thus admitting that 'a decisive 
factor in affirming the existence of an abuse is the 
teleological scope of the Community rules invoked' 
(para. 68)}. 
# Such a track of thought should inform the 
interpretation of all Community law —'this notion 
of abuse operates as a principie governing the 
interpretation of Community law' (para. 68). 
® The notion of abuse is purely objective — thus: 
'artificiality should not be based on an assessment 
of the subjective intentions of those claiming the 
Community right. The artificial nature of certain 
events or transactions must certainly be determined 
on the basis of a set of objective circumstances 
verified in each individual case' (para. 69), and: 'the 
intentions of the parties to improperly obtain an 
advantage from Community law are merely infer-
able from the artificial character of the situation to 
be assessed in the light of a set of objective 
circumstances' (para. 70). 
• Not only to determine the existence of abuse, also 
in order to counter abuse, a purposive interpreta-
tion of the norm must follow: 'Provided that those 
objective circumstances are founcl to exist one must 
conclude that a person who relies upon the literal 
meaning of a Community law provisión to claim a 
right that runs counter to its purposes does not 
deserve to have that right upheld'. In such 
circumstances 'the legal provisión at issue must 
. be interpreted, contrary to its literal meaning, as 
actually not conferring the right'108 (para. 70, 
author's emphasis). 
Finally, the Advócate General transfers all this reason-
ing to the problem of tax avoidance in the VAT. 
Departing from a general assumption that 'the 
common system of VAT is likewise not immune to 
the risk, inherent in every legal system, that actions 
may be taken which, despite formally complying with 
a legal provisión, amount to abusive exploitation of 
the possibilities left open by that provisión, contrary to 
its purposes and objectives' (para. 72), which of course 
can easily be made extensible to any other tax. Mr. 
Peñares dedicares special attention to justify why this 
abuse doctrine should be appliecl to VAT: 
'It is difficult, therefore, to conceive the common 
system of VAT as a sort of abuse-free domain 
within the Community legal system where that 
principie would not have to be respected. There is 
no reason why such a general principie of Commu-
nity law should have to depend, in this área, on an 
express statement by the legislature that the 
provisions of VAT directives also do not escape 
the rule, consistently upheld by the Court, that no 
provisión of Community law can be formally relied 
upon to secure advantages manifestly contrary to its 
purposes and objectives. Such a rule, conceived as a 
principie of interpretation, constitutes an indispen-
sable safety-va.lve for protecting the aims of all 
provisions of Community law against a formalistic 
application of thern based solely on their plain 
meaning'1 (para. 73, author's emphasis). 
After reading this, one can only wonder: why devote so 
many words to something so obvious, namely, that law 
should not be abused? The only feasible answer is that 
the Opinión is implicitly admitting that the ECJ 
approach on tax avoidance has indeed been quite 
formalistic. Only that. can explain why so many times 
in the subsequent paragraphs the same idea is 
repeated.109 
Member States do not need to be authorised by the 
Specifically, as described in the Opinión (para 65), ' the Court was asked whcthcr an exponer could be divested of irs right to an exporr refund despite che fact chat 
the formal conditions for the grant of the refund were met in accordance with the relevant provisions of Commission Regulación (EEC) No 2730/79 of 29 
November 1979 laying down common dctailcd rules for thc application of the systems of export refunds on agricultural produets, In essence, thc goods at issue had 
been the subiect of a U-turn seríeme under which they were exported and released for home use in a third country but were immediately re-imported into the 
Community unaltered and by the  same means of transport '  
Author's einphasis  
'The idea that this notion is equally applicable in the sphere of VAT is entirely consisten! with the posición recently adopted by the Court in Gemeente Leusden, 
according to which 'prevención of possible tax evasión, avoidance or abuse are objectives which are recognised and positively encouraged by che Sixth Directive' 
(para 73) 'To thc exrent to which that principie is conceived as a general principie of interpretación it does not require express Icgislacivc recognition by the 
Community legislature to render it applicable to thc provisions of thc Sixth Directive  From che mere absence of a provisión in the Sixth Directive cxprcssly setting 
out a principie of incerpretation whereby abuses are proscribed - and the same could apply, for example, to the principies of legal cercainry or the protection of 
legitímate expectations, as che Irish Government observed at the hearíng— we cannot therefore draw the conclusión that the Community legislature intended to 
exelude that principie from che Sixth Directive  Conversely, even if there were a provisión in the Sixth Directive cxprcssly stating that principie, it could be 
regarded, as the Commission pointed out, as a mere declaración or codification of an existing general principie' (para 74)  
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Directive to apply their GAARs or judicial doctrines; 
the Advócate General expressly recognises the applica-
tion of GAARs, and for that matter, judicial anti-
avoidance doctrines, to VAT, without it being 
necessary that Member States actually establish 
appropriate anti-avoidance provisions following Art. 
27 of the Sixth Directive, for if that were the case, 'the 
Common system of VAT would become a peculiar 
legal domain where virtually any opportunistic beha-
viour by taxable persons relying on the literal meaning 
of its provisions to improperly gain tax advantages 
against the tax authorities would have to be tolerated 
unless the Member States liad previously adopted 
legislative measures forbidding such behaviour' (para. 
75). 
'I see no reason, in short, why the VAT rules should 
not be interpreted in accordance with the general 
principie of the prohibition of abuse of Community 
law. It is true that tax law is frequently dominated by 
legititnate concerns about legal certainty, deriving, in 
particular, from the need to guarantee the predict-
ability of the Financial burden imposed on taxpayers 
and the principie of no taxation without representa-
tion. However, a comparative analysis of the 
Member States' legal rules is sufficient to make it 
clear that such concerns do not exelude the use of 
certain general provisions and indeterminate con-
cepts in the realm of tax law to prevent illegitimate 
tax avoidance. Legal certainty must be balanced 
against other valúes of the legal system. Tax law 
should not become a sort of legal "wild-west" in 
vvhich virtually every sort of opportunistic behaviour 
has to be tolerated so long as it conforms with a strict 
formalistic interpretation of the relevant tax provi-
sions and the legislature has not expressly taken 
measures to prevent such behaviour' (para. 76). 
In a footnote, the Advócate General expressly men-
tions most existing anti-avoidance measures in Mem-
ber States, including the Spanish s. 15 of the LGT. 
An interpretation consistent with EU law does not 
necessarily have to limit the scope and application of 
anti-avoidance measures: 'Provided that those Com-
munity law provisions purport to achieve certain aims 
and results, the domestic rules irnpíementing them 
must be interpreted and applied by national authorities 
in accordance with those purposes' (para. 80). 
The construction of the Community law notion of 
abuse must comply with the principies of legal 
certainty and of the protection of legitímate expecta-
tions of taxpayers: the Advócate General is familiar 
with the ongoing reproaches that GAARs are not 
certain enough to meet the strictfer?) standards of the 
rule of law in the tax field, so he soothingly states that: 
'the objective analysis of the prohibition of abuse has 
to be balanced against the principies of legal certainty 
and protection of legitímate expectations that also 
form part oF the Community legal system. From those 
principies it Follows that taxpayers must be entitled to 
know in advance what their tax position will be and, 
For that purpose, to rely on the plain meaning of the 
words oF the VAT legislation' (para. 83). 
By the same token, the Advócate General also seems 
to Feel compelled to tranquilise taxpayers, and goes on 
to acknowledge the ECJ rules that 'diere is no legal 
obligation to run a business in such a way as to 
maximise tax revenue For the State. The basic principie 
is that of the freedom to opt for the least taxed route to 
conduct business in order to minimise costs', but of 
course does not fail to stress the fundamental point 
(that makes the 'right' not to be a right after all, as 
shown in previous pages), which is that 'such freedom 
of choice exists only within the scope of the legal 
possibilities provided For by the VAT regime. The 
normative goal oF the principie oF prohibition of abuse 
within the VAT system is precisely that of defining the 
realm oF choices that the common VAT rules have leFt 
open to taxable persons. Such a definition must. take 
into account the principies of legal certainty and of the 
protection of taxpayers' legitímate expectations' (para. 
84). 
Once the two main fears of taxpayers before 
GAARs - that they are not too vague and that they 
respect the possibility of choosing the road less taxes — 
have been dealt with 'by virtue of those principies, the 
scope of the Community law interpretative principie 
prohibiting abuse of the VAT rules must be defined in 
such a way as not to affect legitímate trade' (para. 85), 
the Opinión finally goes on to admit the full 
applicability of tax avoidance doctrines in VAT. In 
doing this, the Opinión fully admits the main elements 
of GAARs as described in the first part of this article. 
Starting by the definition, prohibition of abuse 
means that: 
'the right claimed by a taxable person is excluded 
only when the relevant economic activity carried 
out has no other objective explanation than to 
créate that claim against the tax authorities and 
recognition of the right would conflict with the 
purposes and results envisaged by the relevant 
provisions oF the common system oF VAT. Eco-
nomic activity oF that kind, even if not unlawful, 
deserves no protection from the Community law 
principies of legal certainty and protection of 
legitímate expectations because its only likely 
purpose is that of subverting the aims of the legal 
system itselF' (para. 85). 
There are two elements to the notion oF abuse that 
must be present at the same time (paras. 86—87): the 
First is only Formally a subjective element, as it must be 
objectively determined with regard to the purpose oF 
the activities (not the motive oF the taxpayers), and 
which will depart From the 'absence of any other 
economic justiFication For the activity than that oF 
creating a tax advantage'. And the second is oF 
teleological nature, 'whereby the purpose and objec-
tives oF the Community rules allegedly being abused 
are compared with the purpose and results achieved by 
the activity at issue'. 
'This second element is important', so the Opinión 
goes, 'not only because it pro vides the standard upon 
which the purpose and results oF the activity in question 
are to be assessed. It also provides a saFeguard For those 
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instáhces where the solé purpose of the activity might be 
to diminish tax liability but where that parpóse is 
actually a result of a choice between different tax 
regimes that the Community legislature intended to 
leave open. Therefore, where there is no contradiction 
between recognition of the claim made by the taxable 
person and the aims and results pursued by the legal 
provisión invoked, no abuse can be asserted.' 
The Opinión then fully assesses the problem with 
protected transactions. Finally, as savings clause, there 
will be no tax avoidance 'where the economic activity 
carried out may have some explanation other than the 
mere attainment of tax advantages against tax 
authoriti.es' (para. 88). 
The conclusión is that the taxable persons, accord-
ing to the purposes of the VAT system of deduction 
just described, should not be able to deduce or recover 
input VAT except on a limited proportion of their 
inputs, have put into effect schemes that have enabled 
them to circumvent that result and recover input VAT 
in full. But, this must be established by the national 
courts (paras. 93—96). 
4. A final word 
This recent Opin ión is perfectly in une with the 
common knowledge of tax avoidance that has been 
examined in this article. Th i s should be welcomed, for 
at the present moment the ECJ interpretat ion on tax 
avoidance may be excessively strict. T h e ECJ has 
indeed tried to protect the fiscal interest of the Member 
States, but it has also carried out an interpretation tha t 
primarily p romotes the realisation of the fundamental 
freedoms, sometimes, in this au tho r ' s view, at the 
expense of accomplishing the very legitímate objectives 
sought for by ant i -avoidance legislation. In the end, 
however, the Cour t may be put t ing in jeopardy the 
very same thing that it claims to protect : a coherent 
and functioning c o m m o n marke t . N o t only are taxes 
'what we pay for civilized society\ as j u d g e Holmes 
pu t it,110 but the whole idea tha t taxes should 'respect ' , 
not tamper with, not. hinder, no t stand in the way, not 
be a burden etc. to the normal functioning of a market 
might be a fiction at best of t imes, as it departs from a 
reality that has been to some extent invented. As the 
very suggcstive and comprehensive w o r k of Liam 
Murphy and T h o m a s Nagel {The Myth of Ownership  
Taxes and Justice. London , O U P , 2002) demonstra tes , 
taxes are and indissoluble par t of the marke t economy 
as we know it, are therefore intrinsic, never external , 
to its functioning. 
Clearly, this is not exclusive of anti-avoidance 
measures. In the end, in the words of F. Vanistendael, 
tax sovereignty 'is limited to the extent that it restriets 
the basic economic freedoms, . . . Member States still 
retain their fundamental right of their tax reverme, 
though not the exact shape and form in which their 
income taxes are imposed on their taxpayers. 
Member States should learn to live with this 
phenomenon and if they want to do something about 
it, they better agree to legislare at the European 
level'.111 Not only EU integration, but the growing 
globalisation is increasingly changing and transform-
ing the tax systems as we know them. At the present 
moment, all Member States' tax law in the EU finds 
itself at the crossroads between globalisation, the 
different legal forms ín civil or privare law, and the 
fundamental freedoms.112 
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